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THE BURDENS OF ALL: PROGRESSIVE
ORIGINS OF ACCIDENT COST
SOCIALIZATION IN TORT LAW,
1870–1920
JOSEPH A. RANNEY*
Scholars who have studied the Progressive Movement’s contributions to
American law have paid little attention to its impact on tort law. This Article
helps fill the gap by examining the ways in which Progressivism shaped the rise
of employer liability law, workers compensation, and comparative negligence
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The Article places
these reforms within the broader social history of American tort law—a
gradual, often tortuous transition from free-labor beliefs that the law should
encourage personal responsibility and economic growth above all else to a
realization that injuries are an unavoidable cost of economic modernization,
accompanied by a long-running debate over the extent to which the costs of
accidents should be socialized.
The Article first examines the common law origins of the contributory
negligence doctrine, which allowed only completely faultless victims to recover
for their injuries. It then describes the post-Civil War rise of statutes and
judicial decisions which tried to preserve notions of personal responsibility
while modestly expanding victims’ ability to recover through devices such as
expansion of employers’ liability for negligence of a victim’s fellow workers
and of their duties to maintain a safe workplace. These reforms evolved in
highly piecemeal fashion.
Workers’ compensation and comparative negligence, both products of the
Progressive Era, represented a revolution in tort law. The former took
workplace accidents out of tort law and put them into no-fault systems funded
largely by employers. The latter overturned contributory negligence, allowing
many negligent victims to recover in proportion to defendants’ fault. The
Article describes the Progressive campaign for workers compensation, in
which Progressive reformers employed stereotypically “masculine” arguments
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Article is adapted from THE BURDENS OF ALL: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TORT LAW
(Carolina Academic Press, 2021), which was written under the auspices of the Schoone Fellowship.
The Author gratefully acknowledges the Fellowship’s and Marquette University Law School’s support
of this project. Thanks also to Alex Lemann for providing valuable criticisms and insights.
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based on deductive reasoning and statistics as well as stereotypically
“feminine” arguments based on stories, told most notably by Crystal Eastman,
that brought home to middle-class Americans the human cost of industrial
accidents. American courts almost universally upheld workers-compensation
laws’ constitutionality against substantive-due-process challenges; the Article
argues this was due in part to Progressive anger at perceived judicial
resistance to other reforms, an anger that many judges implicitly heeded.
Comparative negligence advanced more slowly. After Congress and several
states adopted it for railroad workers (1907–19) and Mississippi adopted it for
all injury cases (1910), the movement went into a long period of dormancy,
prompted, the Article argues, by lingering fears that its expansion of juries’
powers would lead to abuse of that power.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On a cold winter day in 1836, one Roper, while driving his sleigh down a
steep hill near Utica, New York, ran into and seriously injured two-year-old
William Hartfield, a child who had wandered onto the highway.1 Who would
bear the cost of those injuries? In Hartfield v. Roper (1839), New York Justice
Esek Cowen and his colleagues delivered a harsh answer: the child and his
parents must bear the entire cost. Cowen chastised William’s parents for letting
him go without supervision; he concluded that their negligence must be imputed
to William and that therefore, he would not be allowed to recover against Roper.
“[W]hen [a plaintiff] complains of wrong to himself,” said Cowen, “the
defendant has a right to insist that he should not have been the heedless
instrument of his own injury. He cannot, more than any other, make a profit of
his own wrong.”2
Hartfield was one of the first American cases to adopt the doctrine of
contributory negligence, holding that any negligence on an accident victim’s
part, no matter how minor, barred recovery.3 The doctrine reflected two
powerful currents of early-nineteenth-century American thought: free labor and
instrumentalism. The free-labor ethic, which had its origins in sources as
diverse as Adam Smith and antislavery orators including Abraham Lincoln,
celebrated individual self-reliance and hard work and held that success, defined
in terms of both prosperity and personal independence, would come to all who
practiced those virtues. Free-labor adherents insisted that individual rights went
hand-in-hand with individual responsibility, and they looked with suspicion on
those who sought government assistance or any sort of wealth redistribution as
a means of ameliorating social and economic inequality.4
Legal
1. Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
2. Id. at 630.
3. Some historians have pointed to two English cases, Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep.
926 (K.B.1809) and Flower v. Adam, 127 Eng. Rep. 1098 (C.P. 1810) as the cases most responsible
for implanting contributory negligence in American law, but American state courts relied more
frequently on Hartfield and other American authorities than on English cases. See Smith v. Smith, 19
Mass. 621, 622 (1824); and Lane v. Crombie, 29 Mass. 177 (1831); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The
Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1189–92 (1990);
Fleming James Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 692–93 (1953). Another early
American contributory negligence case is Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow. 78, 79–80 (N.Y. 1823).
4. Smith described control over one’s own labor as a fundamental property and liberty right. 1
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 146–75
(1776). In an 1859 speech, Lincoln praised American workers who, he said, “ask[] no favor of capital
on the one hand, nor of hirelings or slaves on the other. . . . If any continue through life in the condition
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instrumentalism, formed during an era in which release of individual creative
energy was the dominant value, was a preference among lawmakers “for
property put to creative new use rather than property content with what it is.”5
Many legislators and courts shaped the law to accommodate that preference,
rejecting the common law’s traditional preferences when they conflicted with
the interests of enterprises–some of which, particularly railroads and factories,
became a regular source of accidents and injuries.6
Contributory negligence would remain a dominant part of tort law for many
decades, but as the twentieth century approached, dissenting voices and new
sensibilities appeared. Many Americans came to view accidents and injuries in
social rather than individual terms, as an inevitable byproduct of an urbanizing,
industrializing society, and they questioned the fairness and practicality of a
doctrine which, in the words of Florida Chief Justice George McWhorter, “says
you were both at fault and draws from that premise the conclusion that one
alone must bear all the damage, provided that one is the plaintiff.”7 In 1907,
Wisconsin’s legislature enacted a comparative-negligence law that allowed
railroad workers to recover from their employers when the railroads’
negligence “was greater than the negligence of the employe [sic] . . . and
contribut[ed] in a greater degree to such injury.”8 The following year, Congress
enacted the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), a “pure” comparativenegligence law that allowed interstate railroad workers a recovery proportional
to their employer’s negligence even where the worker’s negligence was
greater,9 and in 1910, Mississippi enacted the first comparative-negligence law
that applied to all types of accidents.10 Comparative negligence was not the
of the hired laborer, it is not the fault of the system, but because of either a dependent nature which
prefers it, or of improvidence, folly, or singular misfortune.” ROY P. BASLER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 500–01 (1946) (speech at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Sept. 30, 1859).
5. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES 28 (1956).
6. Id. at 28; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–
1860, at 16–30 (1977). Some scholars have questioned whether nineteenth-century judges applied
instrumentalism in the tort arena. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in
Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) (study of New Hampshire
and California court decisions); James L. Hunt, Note, Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law
and Political Change in Nineteenth-Century North Carolina, 66 N.C. L. REV. 421 (1988); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1989) (Delaware,
Maryland and South Carolina); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41
ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) (New York and Illinois); Nathan Honson, Note, Iowa Tort History, 1839–
1869: Subsidization of Enterprise or Equitable Allocation of Liability?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 811 (1996).
7. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700, 737 (1886).
8. 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 903; WIS. STAT. § 1816(4) (1911).
9. Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–53 (1908).
10. 1910 Miss. Laws 125.
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only reform that broke through at that time. In May 1910, New York enacted
the nation’s first workers compensation law, a law which marked the
culmination of a thirty-year campaign.11 The law removed the bulk of
workplace-accident cases from tort law altogether and allowed injured workers
to recover compensation, albeit limited in amount, regardless of fault.12
Individually and collectively, workers compensation and comparative
negligence represented an unprecedented advance in the socialization of
accident costs in the United States.
The Progressive Movement’s contributions to American law have been
extensively studied,13 but the movement’s impact on tort law has been curiously
neglected. This Article will partly fill the gap by examining the social and legal
evolution of comparative negligence and workers compensation and analyzing
the ways in which Progressive sensibilities shaped those reforms. The Article
first addresses the origins of contributory negligence, comparative negligence’s
predecessor and counterpoint, with a particular focus on early attempts to soften
or repudiate it, including Georgia’s and Illinois’s experiments with rudimentary
forms of comparative negligence during the 1850s and attempts by several
Midwestern courts during the same decade to cabin the fellow-servant rule,
which shielded employers from liability for injuries caused by the employer’s
other workers.14
Next, the Article traces the growing realization after the war that workplace
accidents were inevitable in a mature industrial economy, that the free-labor
doctrine was not well suited to such an economy, and that both a moral and an
economic case could be made for greater socialization of accident costs. During
the 1860s and 1870s, several Midwestern states, driven by anti-railroad
sentiment, enacted employer liability laws abolishing the fellow-servant rule
for railroad employees.15 During the ensuing decades, states across the nation
enacted a variety of employer-liability laws, ranging from modest codifications
of existing law to abolition of the fellow-servant rule and other employer

11. 1910 N.Y. Laws 625.
12. Id. at 674; see infra notes 250–54 and accompanying text.
13. See e.g., ROBERT F. WESSER, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: POLITICS AND REFORM IN NEW
YORK, 1905–1910 (1967); HOYT LANDON WARNER, PROGRESSIVISM IN OHIO, 1897–1917 (1964);
DAVID P. THELEN, THE NEW CITIZENSHIP: ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVISM IN WISCONSIN, 1885–1900
(1972); ROBERT S. MAXWELL, LA FOLLETTE AND THE RISE OF THE PROGRESSIVES IN WISCONSIN
(1956); HERBERT F. MARGULIES, THE DECLINE OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN WISCONSIN,
1890–1920 (1968); DEWEY GRANTHAM, SOUTHERN PROGRESSIVISM: THE RECONCILIATION OF
PROGRESS AND TRADITION (1983).
14. See infra Parts II.B and II.C.
15. See infra notes 132–40 and accompanying text.
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defenses for most occupations.16 American courts also developed duties and
rules designed to soften contributory negligence, such as an employer’s duty to
furnish safe work conditions and competent fellow workers and a “grace
period” rule which temporarily exempted workers from liability for
contributory negligence if they notified their employers of workplace hazards.
Courts and legislatures also placed restrictions on employers’ right to insist that
workers waive accident liability claims as a condition of employment.17 The
Article examines the holistic evolution of these laws and rules over the course
of the late-nineteenth century.18
These reforms set the stage for the workers compensation and comparative
negligence movements, to which the Article next turns. The American workers
compensation movement began in the 1880s with studies that underscored the
seriousness of industrial accidents as a social problem.19 Progressives used
their considerable public-relations and lobbying skills to generate a steady
stream of research monographs, magazine articles, and legislative studies
supporting reform; that stream reached a critical mass during the years 1900–
1911.20 The Article argues that the movement had two sides: a masculine side
reflected in the data-driven analyses of reformers such as Carroll Wright, John
Commons, and other reformers, and a more feminine side epitomized by
Crystal Eastman, whose Work Accidents and the Law (1910) used stories to
portray the human cost of accidents to workers and their families. Both sides
were essential to the movement’s success.21
Next, the Article examines the practical issues considered by the lawmakers
who enacted early workers compensation laws and the constitutional obstacles
that the laws faced. It analyzes the New York Court of Appeals’ rejection of
its state’s pioneering law in Ives v. South Buffalo Railroad. Co. (1911);22 the
opinions that issued soon afterward from Massachusetts, Washington, and
Wisconsin courts upholding their states’ laws; and later decisions in other states
and in the U.S. Supreme Court that cemented workers compensation’s place in
American law.23 The Article argues that these decisions reflected a broader
judicial move away from free-labor sensibilities, a move that was in part a
16. See infra Parts III.B-III.E.
17. See infra Parts III.B.ii, III.D.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See infra notes 213–32 and accompanying text.
22. Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
23. In re Op. of Justs., 96 N.E. 308 (Mass. 1911); State ex. rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 117
P. 1101 (Wash. 1911); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911); see infra notes 273–
87 and accompanying text.
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response to vocal, Progressive criticisms of judges’ perceived propensity to
override juries and strike down reform laws.24
The Article then turns to the question of why comparative negligence
blossomed during the Progressive Era. It traces the origins of the pioneering
comparative-negligence laws enacted by Wisconsin and Mississippi and by
Congress between 1907 and 1910;25 it then analyzes the constitutional
challenges that the laws faced and briefly traces the evolution of comparative
negligence following the Progressive Era. The Article asks why comparativenegligence laws spread only slowly after 1910 and concludes that the primary
reason was fear of the increased power that comparative negligence gave to
juries.26 The Article concludes by summarizing the ways in which latenineteenth century tort reforms set the stage for Progressive Era breakthroughs
in tort law, and by considering the place of Progressivism in the larger history
of American tort law.27
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ITS EARLY CRITICS
A. Tempering Negligence by Degrees
The individualist mindset that undergirded the free-labor doctrine made it
difficult for most early-nineteenth century American jurists to accept a system
that would allow negligent injury victims to recover any compensation from
negligent defendants.28 Nevertheless, from the beginning many American
judges realized that the contributory negligence doctrine would often lead to
harsh results, and they tried to soften it by viewing negligence in terms of
degrees. They formulated two degree-based frameworks, one based on gross,
ordinary, and slight negligence and the other based on remote and proximate
cause.29 Esek Cowen formulated a degrees of negligence framework in

24. See infra Part V.C.
25. See infra Part VI.A; 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 903; WIS. STAT. § 1816(4) (1911); 1910 Miss.
Laws, 125; Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–53 (1908); see infra notes 358–79 and
accompanying text.
26. See infra Parts VI.B, VII.B.
27. See infra Part VII.
28. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. For examples of that mindset’s influence on
early American tort law, see Hartfield v. Roper 24 Wend. 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839); Bush v. Brainard,
1 Cow. 78 (N.Y. 1823); Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 621 (1824); and Lane v. Crombie, 29 Mass. 177
(1831).
29. See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text.
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Hartfield:30 he held that William Hartfield’s parents were grossly (that is,
willfully or recklessly) negligent, which would have barred recovery even if
Roper had been ordinarily negligent (that is, had failed to exercise ordinary
care), although in Cowen’s view, Roper was not negligent at all.31 The degreesof-negligence framework benefited the defendant in Hartfield, but it could also
be used, and was used in other cases, to benefit plaintiffs where a defendant’s
conduct was egregious.32
Vermont Justice Isaac Redfield and his colleagues made the first important
connection between tort liability and proximity of causation in Trow v. Vermont
Central Railway Co. (1852).33 Trow was a “livestock” case: when Jones Trow’s
horse wandered onto the Vermont Central’s right-of-way, it was struck and
killed by a locomotive.34 Trow did not sue the engineer; instead, he based his
negligence claim on the railroad’s failure to erect protective fencing.35 The
railroad responded that Trow was contributorily negligent because he had failed
to keep his horse under control.36
Redfield was no fan either of Cowen or his degrees-of-negligence
framework,37 and in Trow, he and his colleagues focused on degrees of
causation rather than of negligence. They concluded that each party’s
negligence “was the remote cause of the injury, and equally contributed to the
result.”38 The justices explained that “remote negligence” meant negligence
remote in time from the injury, and that where both parties’ negligence was
remote, the plaintiff could not recover.39 But they then carved an opening in
30. Hartfield, 21 Wend. at 617. Cowen derived the distinction between gross and ordinary
negligence from English bailment law, which provided that bailees (persons charged with the care of
others’ property) would be held to a standard of extraordinary, ordinary, or no care depending on their
relationship with the bailor (customer). English courts had previously indicated that the degrees of
bailment care might be usefully translated into degrees of negligence, but Hartfield was the first
American case in which that translation was made. See also Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909
(1703); see Kaczorowski, supra note 3, 1133–36.
31. Hartfield, 21 Wend. at 622–23.
32. See, e.g., Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R.R. Co., 3 Ohio St., 172 (1854);
Evansville & Crawfordsville R.R. Co. v. Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 120 (1860); Whirley v. Whiteman, 38
Tenn. 610 (1858), abrogated by McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
33. Trow v. Vt. Cent. R.R. Co., 24 Vt. 487 (1852).
34. Id. at 488.
35. Id. at 489.
36. Id. at 488–89.
37. ISAAC F. REDFIELD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF RAILROADS 330 (1858). In
his influential treatise on railroad law, Redfield characterized Hartfield v. Roper (1839) as an unusually
harsh case and noted that other state courts had already tried to develop devices for tempering
contributory negligence’s inherent harshness.
38. Trow, 24 Vt. at 494.
39. Id.
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the wall of contributory negligence: a plaintiff whose negligence was remote
could recover if the defendant’s negligence proximately caused his injury.40
The justices then sent the case back for a new trial, suggesting to Trow that he
should consider making a claim against the engineer.41 If Trow could show that
the accident “might have been avoided by the defendant, in the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence” despite Trow’s earlier negligence—in the words
of later commentators, if the engineer had a “last clear chance” to avoid the
collision—then the engineer’s negligence would be considered a proximate
cause and Trow could recover.42
Cowen’s degrees-of-negligence framework was fashionable for a time, but
in the end, it proved too difficult to apply. Other courts began to criticize it in
the 1850s,43 and in 1885, Charles Beach, the author of one of the era’s leading
tort law treatises, pronounced the framework dead, criticizing the grossordinary-slight negligence distinction as “a troublesome and unnecessary
refinement.”44 Cowen’s successors too retreated from the framework,45 but
confusion lingered in its wake46 and it would resurface as comparative
negligence evolved.47 Vermont’s framework of remote and proximate cause
proved more durable, but American courts constantly struggled to’’sl define
proximate cause, and these efforts also produced more confusion than clarity.48
Even luminaries such as Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw conceded
that “[t]he whole doctrine of causation . . . is of profound difficulty, even if it

40. Id. at 494–95.
41. Id. at 494.
42. Id. at 495. As to the evolution of the “last clear chance” rule, see Fleming James, Jr., Last
Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 704–07 (1938); Malcolm M. MacIntyre,
The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1225–32 (1940).
43. See Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (1855); see also Catawissa R.R. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa.
186 (1865).
44. THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
§§ 16, 37 (1869); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 630–31 (1879); CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, OR NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE § 17 (2d ed. 1892).
45. Fero v. Buffalo & State Line R.R. Co., 22 N.Y. 209 (1860); Wells v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,
24 N.Y. 181 (1862); Wilds v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 24 N.Y. 430 (1862).
46. See, e.g., Randall v. Nw. Tel. Co., 54 Wis. 140, 148, 11 N.W. 419, 423 (1882).
47. See infra notes 353, 397 and accompanying text.
48. Early decisions adopting the Vermont framework produced definitions including acts
“directly contributing” to an accident, acts after which the accident became unavoidable, Button v.
Hudson River R.R. Co., 18 N.Y. 248, 254, 258 (1858); acts “which directly or by natural consequence
conduces to the injury,” Richmond v. Sacramento Valley R.R. Co., 18 Cal. 351, 357 (1861); and acts
“simultaneous in operation with that of the defendants, of the same kind, immediate, growing out of
the same transaction.” Isbell v. N.Y. & New Haven R.R. Co., 27 Conn. 393, 406 (1858).
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may not be said of mystery,”49 and tort law scholars such as Shearman and
Redfield50 and Michigan Chief Justice Thomas Cooley were unable to cut the
knot of confusion.51 Proximate cause became a malleable concept, often
tailored to fit individual cases based on judges’ sensibilities, and by the middle
of the twentieth century most American courts would openly acknowledge that
fact.52
B. Small Rebellions, Part One: Comparative Negligence in Georgia and
Illinois
In the 1850s, Georgia’s Supreme Court took the first step toward
comparative negligence. Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin, a jurist of national
reputation who viewed use of degrees of negligence as “impracticable,”53 was
the chief inventor. In Macon & Western Railroad Co. v. Winn (1856), he
endorsed the “last clear chance” rule; he then added that “[h]e who is most
negligent, can never ask a Court for compensation [but] he who is least so, may
or may not, according to the facts and circumstances of the case.”54 This
statement in itself did not conflict with contributory negligence but soon
afterward, in Flanders v. Meath (1859), Lumpkin said his decision in Winn
really meant that “when both parties are in fault, but the defendant most so, the
fault of the plaintiff may go in mitigation of damages.”55 This was the
breakthrough, and two years later a committee charged with recodifying
Georgia’s statutes added a law that incorporated the Flanders holding.56
49. Marble v. City of Worcester, 70 Mass. 395, 397 (1855). For an example of the continuing
confusion in one state, see Pritchard v. La Crosse & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 7 Wis. 200 (1858)
(attempting to equate proximate cause with gross negligence); Stucke v. Milwaukee & Miss. R.R. Co.,
9 Wis. 182 (1859); Chi. & Nw. R.R. Co. v. Goss, 17 Wis. 428 (1863); Galpin v. Chi. & Nw. R.R. Co.,
19 Wis. 637 (1865); Fisher v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 21 Wis. 73 (1866).
50. See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 44, § 33 (stating that “proximate” means “near in
the order of causation”).
51. COOLEY, supra note 44 at 68–69 (defining a proximate cause as one “from which . . . the
injury followed as a direct and immediate consequence” and suggesting that the foreseeability of the
harm might play a role in determining proximity).
52. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100–01, 103–04 (N.Y. 1928);
Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 231–32, 234 N.W. 372, 376 (1931); WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 45 (1st ed. 1941); see also FOWLER HARPER & FLEMING JAMES,
JR., THE LAW OF TORTS (1956); Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1 (1957); Leon Green, Duties,
Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1962).
53. Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Davis, 18 Ga. 679, 684 (1855).
54. Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Winn, 19 Ga. 440, 446 (1856).
55. Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358, 362 (1859).
56. R.H. CLARK, T.R.R. COBB & D. IRWIN, THE CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA § 2979
(1861); see also 1855–1856 Ga. Laws 155; Francis S. Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence
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Illinois Supreme Court Justice Sidney Breese and his colleagues also
experimented with modern comparative negligence in the 1850s, but their
experiment was less successful. In 1852, they too adopted the last-clear-chance
rule, but unlike their Georgia counterparts they explicitly linked the rule to
proximate cause, thus complicating a concept of causation that was already
confusing to many litigants.57 In Galena & Chi. Union R.R. Co. v. Jacobs
(1858), Breese tried to clarify the situation, but he only created more confusion.
“The true doctrine,” he said, “ . . . is, that in proportion to the negligence of the
defendant, should be measured the degree of care required of the
plaintiff . . . where there are faults on both sides, the plaintiff shall recover, his
fault being to be measured by the defendant’s negligence.”58 Breese injected
the slight-ordinary-gross framework for good measure: a plaintiff, he said “need
not be wholly without fault” provided that his “negligence is comparatively
slight, and that of the defendant gross.”59 Most Illinois trial courts interpreted
these statements as a directive to implement comparative negligence, but
subsequent supreme court decisions, including some written by Breese, put
their interpretation in question: the court suggested that in the Jacobs case,
Breese had merely tried to reaffirm the last-clear-chance rule, albeit
awkwardly.60 In 1894, the court finally put the matter to rest by formally
rejecting comparative negligence.61
Early gestures toward comparative negligence were muddled in part
because the concept elicited sharply conflicting feelings. Georgia’s and
Illinois’s efforts reflected a general unease over contributory negligence, a
feeling that it was unjust to deny an injury victim whose lapse had been minor
any right to recover. Chief Justice McWhorter’s open denunciation of
contributory negligence came in 1886; a year later Florida’s legislature, perhaps
influenced by his statement, adopted Georgia’s comparative negligence statute,
but no other courts or legislatures followed.62 Kansas Supreme Court Justice
(and future U.S. Supreme Court Justice) David Brewer explained their
hesitancy: “[M]any considerations,” he said, “especially the difficulty of
Cases Part II: Some Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 766, 778–80 (1951);
Charles J. Hilkey, Comparative Negligence in Georgia, 8 GA. B. J. 51, 56–59 (1945).
57. Moore v. Moss, 14 Ill. 106 (1852); see also Joliet & N. Ind. R.R. Co. v. Jones, 20 Ill. 221
(1858); Leon Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 44–50 (1944); Philbrick, supra note
56, at 780–81.
58. Galena & Chi. Union R.R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478, 496 (1858).
59. Id. at 496–97.
60. See Green, supra note 57, at 50; Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 3 N.E. 456 (Ill. 1885)
(collecting cases).
61. City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 38 N.E. 892 (Ill. 1894); Green, supra note 57, at 52–53.
62. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700, 737 (1886); 1887 Fla. Laws 117.
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correctly apportioning the damages, and determining to what extent the wrong
of the respective parties was instrumental in causing the injury, uphold the rule
so universally recognized.”63 That hesitancy also arose in part from fears of
expanding juries’ power. Georgia’s Supreme Court had considered the extent
to which judges could cabin juries’ apportionment of negligence under its
comparative-negligence system and had concluded that the system gave them
no means of doing so. “For the apportionment of damages according to the
relative fault of the parties,” said Justice Logan Bleckley, “there seems to be no
standard more definite than the enlightened opinion of the jury.”64 That specter
prompted judges who were open to reform to explore more indirect means of
helping accident victims.
C. Small Rebellions, Part Two: The Fellow-Servant Rule Attacked
During the pre-industrial era, the doctrine of respondeat superior governed
employers’ liability to injured workers for the negligence of fellow employees:
employers were liable for all harm that their employees caused to others.65 But
as corporations proliferated and employer-employee relationships became less
intimate and more contractual, jurists suggested that existing doctrine was too
paternalistic and should be circumscribed. In Priestley v. Fowler (1837), Lord
Abinger, the chief judge of England’s Court of Exchequer, refused to hold an
employer liable to a worker for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow
employee,66 and in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp. (1842),
Massachusetts’s Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw and his colleagues followed suit.67
Echoing free-labor and instrumentalist principles, Shaw concluded that
Nicholas Farwell, an engineer who was injured in a derailment caused by a
switchman’s negligence, had agreed to assume the “natural and ordinary risks
and perils incident to the performance of such services” in return for higher pay
which reflected that risk. 68 Shaw also reasoned that workers were in at least as

63. Kan. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37, 50 (1874).
64. Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Neely, 56 Ga. 540, 544 (1876).
65. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (3rd ed.
1765).
66. Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837); see also Jerrilyn Marston, Comment, The
Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 1837–1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 584–
86 (1984).
67. Farwell v. Bos. & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
68. Id. at 57. Shaw’s conclusion was not without evidentiary support: in some instances, railroad
workers in high-risk positions received premium pay and some railroads agreed to continue workers’
employment or make severance payments and to cover part or all of their medical bills after injury.
Robert J. Kaczorowski, From Petitions for Gratuities to Claims for Damages: Personal Injuries and
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good a position as employers to detect and prevent unsafe practices by their
fellow workers: if their employer refused to remedy such practices, they could
always quit and work elsewhere.69 Shaw recognized that workers could not
always detect safety violations, for example those of workers in company
departments different from their own.70 But because “it would be extremely
difficult to establish a practical rule” determining when an injured worker did
and did not have the power to prevent other workers’ negligence, he would not
allow any exceptions to the new fellow-servant rule.71
Many courts endorsed Shaw’s decision and adopted the fellow-servant
rule,72 but the doctrine encountered resistance in the South and Midwest.
Southern courts applied the rule to white workers,73 but several refused to
extend it to enslaved workers whose owners hired them out to businesses,
absent an express agreement between the hirer and the slaveowner to the
contrary.74 However, this refusal benefited only slaveowners, not injured
slaves.75 Several Midwestern courts criticized Shaw’s reasoning and cabined
the fellow-servant rule for free workers. In Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens
(1851) the majority, speaking through Justice William Caldwell, criticized
Farwell as “contrary to the general principles of law and justice” and adhered
to respondeat superior.76 But Caldwell’s colleague Rufus Spalding argued in
dissent that deviation from the fellow-servant rule would produce “‘alarming
consequences’, when carried into the practical details of business.”77 The
justices had very different images of workingmen: Caldwell wished to protect
“innocent person[s] who had no control or management of the thing that
Railroads During the Industrialization of the United States, 57 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 261, 298–301 (2017);
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 708–11; KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE
AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 28–52 (2008); PETER KARSTEN, HEART
VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 116 (1997).
69. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 59, 61.
70. Id. at 60.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Murray v. S.C. R.R., 26 S.C.L. 38 (1841); Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill 592, 594 (N.Y.
1844); Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R. Co., 23 Pa. 384 (1854); Honner v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 15
Ill. 550 (1854); Michigan Cent. R.R. Co. v. Leahey, 10 Mich. 193 (1862).
73. See, e.g., Murray, 26 S.C.L. 385; Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195 (1846); Hubgh v. New
Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851); Forsyth & Simpson v. Perry, 5 Fla. 337 (1853).
74. See Scudder, 1 Ga. at 199; see also Forsyth, 5 Fla. 337; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Yandell, 56 Ky. 586 (1856); Howes v. Steamer Red Chief, 15 La. Ann. 321 (1860); White v. Smith,
12 Rich. 595 (S.C. 1860).
75. See generally Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow Servants: Ideology, Law, and
Industrialization, 31 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 269 (1987); Frederick Wertheim, Note, Slavery and the FellowServant Rule: An Antebellum Dilemma” 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112 (1986).
76. Little Mia. R.R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 416, 436 (1851).
77. Id. at 440 (Spalding, J., dissenting).
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produced [the injury],”78 but Spalding warned against workers who, through
“the negligence of others, . . . [would] grasp the treasures of the company, and
procure a competency for life.”79 Indiana’s Supreme Court went in another
direction: in Gillenwater v. Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co., it limited
the doctrine to cases where the victim and the fellow worker were in the same
“department” and their concurrent negligence produced injury.80
III. PROGRESSIVE ANTECEDENTS: THE RISE OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY LAWS
A. The Changing Array of Accident Cases
The American Industrial Revolution, which had begun in the early
nineteenth century with scattered water- and steam-powered factories and
railroad construction in eastern states, entered a second phase around 1870. The
Second Industrial Revolution was marked by the rise of large corporations and
factories that relied on wage workers and increasingly sophisticated production
and management techniques,81 and it was also marked by rapid population
growth and steady urbanization.82 Industrialization and urbanization brought
Americans ever more frequently into contact with each other and with
potentially hazardous situations. The number of passenger and freight trains
and the speeds at which they traveled rose steadily, creating an increased level
of danger that crossing signs, whistles and other safety devices could never
completely overcome.83 Electrified streetcars brought similar dangers, as did
the new municipal electric systems that made them possible.84 Workplace
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 432.
Id. at 450 (Spalding, J., dissenting).
Gillenwater v. Madison & Indianapolis R.R. Co., 5 Ind. 339, 345–46 (1854).
See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 79–376 (1977).
82. In 1870, the nation’s population was just over 38 million people; there were twice as many
agricultural workers as manufacturing workers in the American workforce, and American agricultural
output and manufacturing output were roughly equal in value. By 1910 the population had grown to
92 million, nearly half of whom lived in the towns and cities where industry was concentrated;
manufacturing workers outnumbered agricultural workers by forty percent and industrial output was
worth more than twice as much as agricultural output. See FRANCIS A. WALKER, COMPENDIUM OF
THE NINTH CENSUS 594–95, 692, 796, 872 (1872); ABSTRACT OF THE THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1910, at 137 288–89, 437–38 (1914).
83. See MARK ALDRICH, SAFETY FIRST: TECHNOLOGY, LABOR, AND BUSINESS IN THE
BUILDING OF AMERICAN WORK SAFETY, 1870–1939, at 9–40 (1997); see generally ROBERT B. SHAW,
DOWN BRAKES: A HISTORY OF RAILROAD ACCIDENTS, SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND OPERATING
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1961).
84. See SAM BASS WARNER JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON,
1870–1900, at 21–29 (2d ed. 1978). Streetcar accidents accounted for six percent of all tort cases from
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machinery, ever more complex and dangerous, took an increasing toll: “[T]he
power was always turning—and it did not respond to shouts or to a hand, arm,
or body caught in a machine or belting or by the turning shafts.”85
During the Second Industrial Revolution, the number of tort cases coming
before American courts increased sharply. A survey of five sample state
supreme courts during the era has shown that railroad-accident and workplaceaccident cases came to dominate their tort dockets.86 Railroad cases divided
about equally between injuries to livestock wandering onto tracks, persons
struck by trains, and passengers injured in collisions or in boarding or alighting
from trains.87 Trains and rail yards, factories, lumber operations, and
construction sites accounted for the largest number of workplace accidents.88
In 1900, workplace-accident cases exceeded railroad-accident cases for the first
time, but in the 1910s they would diminish in number as workers compensation
laws were enacted.89 Railroad-employee accidents were at the intersection of
the two categories, and they provided the catalyst for the most important legal
reform of the era: employer liability laws.90

1870 to 1920 in the five-state survey referenced in JOSEPH A. RANNEY, THE BURDENS OF ALL: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TORT LAW 199 app. (Carolina Academic Press, 2021).
85. 3 ROBERT C. NESBIT, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN: URBANIZATION AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION 1873–1893 225 (William Fletcher Thompson ed. 1985).
86. The survey examined tort decisions of the New York, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Texas, and
California supreme courts at ten-year intervals from 1870 to 1920. The survey methodology and the
cases examined are set forth in RANNEY, supra note 84, Appendices 2 and 3.
87. RANNEY, supra note 84, Appendices 2 and 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see infra notes 125–35 and accompanying text.
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The Rise of Railroad and Workplace Accidents, 1860–1920 91

B. The Push Against Contributory Negligence Begins
In 1870, contributory negligence was still firmly established in American
tort law, and it had given rise to an important corollary principle: assumption
of risk. Lord Abinger had stated in Priestley that an employer was “bound to
provide for the safety of his servant,”92 but no workplace could ever be
completely risk-free. In Abinger’s view, workers knew this when they made
their employment agreements, and being closer to the work than their employer,
they were in a better position to assess its dangers.93 American courts soon
adopted the assumption of risk principle; in 1854, Pennsylvania Justice Walter
Lowrie warned against liberal construction of employers’ safe-place duties
because that might lead to “a guarantee for the accidents that may befall
[workers] in the use of the machinery which they profess to understand, and
which they ought so to understand as to be able to inform their employers when
it is out of order.”94
Nevertheless, by 1870 there were already signs that contributory negligence
was not a good fit for an industrialized America. Wage workers, mostly
unskilled and dependent on corporations for their livelihood, now outnumbered
91. The figure is compiled from data in RANNEY, supra note 84, Appendices 2 and 3.
92. Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032 (1837).
93. Id. at 1033.
94. Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R. Co., 23 Pa. 384, 385 (1854); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Cox, 21 Ill. 20 (1858).
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craft workers whose special skills gave them greater ability to negotiate
working conditions, and the numerical disparity between the two groups was
growing steadily.95 Wage workers often were a single part of a larger
production process, dependent on other workers’ proper performance of tasks
over which they had no control, and on the proper functioning of machines
whose inner workings and flaws were invisible or incomprehensible to them.96
As the number of work accidents rose, a faint but nagging sense also arose
among jurists and the public that they might to some extent be an unavoidable
byproduct of industrialization and economic growth. If accidents were
inevitable, should fault continue to serve as a guiding principle for allocation
of accident costs?
Some jurists defended the rule of no liability without fault as a bulwark
against governmental encroachment on private liberty and autonomy, but
Francis Hilliard, Thomas Cooley, Thomas Shearman, and Amasa Redfield, all
authors of leading nineteenth-century treatises on tort law, took a softer
approach. They suggested that adherence to the no-liability-without-fault rule
provided the best answer if negligence were defined as a lack of ordinary care.
The ordinary-care standard would preserve the fault principle, but the
irreducible elasticity of the term “ordinary” would give juries some leeway to
take accidents that others might see as fault-free out of that category, for
example by finding negligence in acts of an employer or exonerating an injured
worker from contributory negligence where others might not.97 The treatise
writers’ proposed rule was quickly recognized as imperfect, not least by the
writers themselves: their idea of jury leeway grated against the formalist ideal
that law should be neutral, consistent, and predictable.98 Abinger’s and
Lowrie’s argument proved more durable, but it clashed with the new reality that
workers had limited control over the conditions in which they worked.99 During
the Second Industrial Era, American judges responded to these tensions by
making regular efforts to soften the free-labor principles articulated in Priestley
and its progeny without breaking with them altogether.100

95. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 31–33, 35–36 (2004).
96. Id. at 35–41; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 68, at 28–52.
97. 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 122–23, 137–38 (4th ed.
1874); COOLEY, supra note 44, at 667–87; SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 44 , §§ 53–54; WITT,
supra note 95, at 46–49.
98. Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1980).
HILLIARD, supra note 97, at 122–23, 137–38; COOLEY, supra note 44, at 667–87; SHEARMAN &
REDFIELD, supra note 44, §§ 53–54; WITT, supra note 95, at 46–49.
99. WITT, supra note 95, at 33.
100. See infra Parts III.B.i, III.B.ii, and III.C.
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i. Distractions and Emergencies
Two new devices for softening contributory negligence, the distraction rule
and the emergency rule, took hold at the beginning of the Second Industrial Era.
As early as 1860, the argument was made to Massachusetts’s Supreme Court
that people are often distracted by their own thoughts or unexpected events
happening nearby and that in such situations, their failure to be mindful of
hazards is not inconsistent with ordinary care and should not be treated as
negligence.101 The justices rejected the argument, stating that it was “equivalent
to a positive declaration that [the plaintiff] was utterly incautious,”102 but a few
years later they relented: juries could consider distraction as an excuse for what
would otherwise be contributory negligence.103 Beginning in the early 1870s,
other state courts also endorsed the idea of distraction as a defense against
claims of contributory negligence, and by the turn of the century the rule was
generally accepted in American courts.104
Late-nineteenth century courts also recognized that plaintiffs might be
confronted with an emergency—for example, an unexpected but imminent train
collision—that required them to make an instant choice between several risky
alternatives—such as jumping off or staying with the train. In such cases, a
choice that proved mistaken would not be treated as lack of ordinary care.105
The emergency rule first appeared in the early nineteenth century;106 it did not

101. Gilman v. Inhabitants of Deerfield, 81 Mass. 577, 580–81 (1860).
102. Id. at 581.
103. See Smith v. City of Lowell, 88 Mass. 39 (1863) (indicating that plaintiffs were not required
to be constantly attentive to their surroundings); Weare v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 334,
339 (1872) (stating: “Previous knowledge of the existence of the defect, and a residence in its
immediate neighborhood, are not conclusive” of contributory negligence).
104. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Town of Westport, 30 Wis. 392 (1872); Cohen v. Eureka & Palisade
R.R. Co., 14 Nev. 376 (1879). Courts interpreted the rule with varying degrees of liberality: compare
Dale v. Webster Cnty., 41 N.W. 1 (Iowa 1888) (noting that plaintiff walked onto bridge and fell off it
while reading a newspaper; held, distraction rule did not apply) with Van Praag v. Gale, 40 P. 555 (Cal.
1895) (noting that plaintiff walked into an elevator shaft while reading a newspaper; held, rule applied;
court emphasized that the shaft had been closed earlier but was not closed at the time of the accident).
See generally SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 44, § 375.
105. See authorities cited infra notes 106–08.
106. Jones v. Boyce, 171 Eng. Rep. 640 (N.P. 1816) and Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 181
(1839).
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emerge as a defense to contributory negligence until the 1850s,107 but it was
widely adopted after that time.108
ii. Reinforcing Employers’ Safe-place Duties
As workplace accidents grew in number, American courts modestly
expanded the scope of employers’ safe-place duties. During the 1850s and
1860s, a consensus emerged that, in addition to ensuring that workplaces and
equipment were safe when originally provided to workers, employers must also
eliminate defects and hazards brought to their attention.109 Whether that duty
included a continuing obligation to inspect for hazards proved to be a more
difficult question. In Warner v. Erie Railroad. Co. (1868), New York’s highest
court answered it by applying the ordinary-care standard: employers must
monitor equipment “with frequency, and with such tests as custom and
experience have sanctioned and prescribed.”110 Thus, the extent of an
employer’s obligation to monitor equipment would depend on customs
determined by employers themselves. For instrumentalist reasons, the court
refused to impose a duty of continuous monitoring: that would come too close
to an absolute standard of care, which would “carry [employers’] corporate
liability beyond reason” and impose an “intolerable burden.”111 Other states
soon adopted the Warner standard,112 although a few courts indicated that a
duty of continuous monitoring should be adopted and others described the duty

107. Cook & Scott v. Parham, 24 Ala. 21 (1853). Cook involved a slaveowner’s claim against
defendant for loss of his slave; as in other such cases, the court considered the slaveowner’s economic
interest more than humanity toward slaves in determining who should bear the loss. See supra notes
74–75 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Ingalls v. Bills, 50 Mass. 1 (1845); Frink v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406 (1856); Hegan v.
Eighth Ave. R.R. Co., 15 N.Y. 380 (1857); Sw. R.R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356 (1858); Jeffersonville
R.R. Co. v. Swift, 26 Ind. 459 (1866); and Schultz v. Chi. & Nw. R.R. Co., 44 Wis. 638 (1878). See
also SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 44, § 89 and authorities there cited.
109. See, e.g., Keegan v. W. R.R. Corp., 4 Selden 175 (N.Y. 1853); Carle v. Bangor &
Piscataquis Canal & R.R. Co., 43 Me. 269 (1857); Hallower v. Henley, 6 Cal. 209 (1856); Indianapolis.
& Cincinnati R.R. Co., 10 Ind. 554 (1858); Hard v. Vt. & Can. R.R. Co., 32 Vt. 473 (1860), abrogated
by Davis v. Central Vt. R.R. Co., 55 Vt. 84 (1882); Snow v. Housatonic R.R. Co., 8 Allen 441 (Mass.
1864); Chi. & Nw. R.R. Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 197 (1867).
110. Warner v. Erie R.R. Co., 39 N.Y. 468, 475 (1868).
111. Id. at 475–76.
112. See, e.g., Columbus & Indianapolis Cent. Ry. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174 (1869), overruled
in part by Dill v. Marmon, 73 N.E. 67 (Ind. 1905); Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Dunham, 49 Tex.
181 (1878); Norfolk & W. R.R. Co. v. Jackson’s Adm’r, 8 S.E. 370 (Va. 1888); SHEARMAN &
REDFIELD, supra note 44, § 194(a).
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in terms so strong as to suggest that more than ordinary care was required of
employers.113
Priestley did not address whether employers’ safe-place duty included an
obligation to employ competent workers, but British and American courts soon
held that it did.114 Again, the difficult question was whether the duty continued
after the workers were hired. In 1855, Ohio’s Supreme Court held that
employers would be liable for continuing to employ workers after they had been
“shown to be incompetent or unsuitable,”115 but in 1868 the House of Lords
held, and New York’s highest court suggested in Warner, that the employer’s
duty ended after the hiring process was completed.116 A few states agreed with
New York,117 but others did not. For example, Illinois Chief Justice Sidney
Breese reasoned that in an age where railroads and other large corporations had
“countless lives and unnumbered property committed daily to their care,”
employment of responsible workers was a public, not merely a private matter.118
And many states that refused to impose a continuing duty of care to monitor
employees’ reliability adopted a “grace period” rule which mitigated the harsh
effects of that refusal.119 The rule provided that if a worker warned his
employer of a dangerous workplace condition and the employer promised to fix
it, that would trigger a grace period during which the worker could continue to
work in the presence of the condition without being held to have assumed the
risk of injury.120 The rule gained near-universal acceptance and was soon
extended to cover warnings about problematic fellow workers.121 The rule had
113. See, e.g., Swett, 45 Ill. 197 (1867); Davis, 55 Vt. 84 (1882); Peschel v. Chi., Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. Co., 62 Wis. 338, 351–53, 21 N.W. 269, 274–78 (1885) (dissent of Justice David Taylor
suggesting that unconditional duty should be imposed).
114. See, e.g., Mad River & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541 (1856); Frazier v. Pa.
R.R. Co., 38 Pa. 104 (1861); Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle & Berwick Ry. Co., 155 Eng. Rep. 150
(1850); Wigmore v. Jay, 155 Eng. Rep. 155 (1850); see also THOMAS BEVAN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW:
GENERAL RELATIONS 663–65 (3d ed. 1908) (discussing British cases).
115. Mad River, 5 Ohio St. at 561.
116. Wilson v. Merry & Cunningham, (1868) 4 Scot. 568; Warner v. Erie Ry. Co 39 N.Y. 468,
475 (1868) (citing Wilson with approval and stating: “[T]he duty of the master was to select proper
and competent persons to do the work . . . , and when he had done that, he had performed his whole
duty”).
117. See, e.g., Heine v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 58 Wis. 525, 531–32, 17 N.W. 420, 422–23 (1883).
118. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Jewell, 46 Ill. 99, 101–02 (1867).
119. See infra Parts III.C-III.E.
120. SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 44, § 96; see infra notes 124–26 and accompanying
text.
121. See, e.g., Kroy v. Chi., R.I. & Pac. R.R. Co., 32 Iowa 357 (1871); Snow v. Housatonic R.R.
Co., 8 Allen 441 (Mass. 1864); Clarke v. Holmes, (1862) 258 Eng. Rep. 751; SHEARMAN & REDFIELD,
supra note 44, § 96; FRANCIS WHARTON, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence §§ 220–21 (1874);
Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk: II, 20 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1906) (citing cases).
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limitations: the grace period would last only a reasonable time;122 workers could
not invoke the rule if the condition at issue was obviously and imminently
hazardous;123 and in cases of injury resulting from latent defects in machinery
and equipment, the worker would be deemed to have assumed the risk and must
bear his own loss.124
C. The Rise of Employer Liability Laws
American legislatures also wrestled with allocation of liability for railroad
and workplace injuries, and they did so in a much more public way. Between
1870 and 1910, they enacted a wide variety of employer liability statutes that
ranged from codification of judicially created tort rules to elimination of the
fellow-servant rule and other employer defenses.125 The statutes were a
barometer of changing American attitudes toward concepts of fault and
allocation of accident costs.
The employer liability law movement arose out of a broader legal reaction
to railroads that had begun in the 1850s. Before the Civil War, American states
and municipalities had subsidized railroad construction heavily through stock
purchases and bond issues.126 Loss of those investments due to railroad
bankruptcies—and judicial rejection of local governments’ efforts to recoup
their losses through arguments that subsidies to private corporations were
constitutionally invalid—left a strong residue of resentment toward railroads.127
After the war, railroads, buoyed by improved economic conditions,
consolidated their lines and enacted complex and often discriminatory freight
and passenger rates, acts that were economically defensible but deeply
unpopular.128 They also gained a reputation for poor treatment of customers, a
122. See, e.g., Patterson v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R.R. Co., 76 Pa. 389 (1874); WHARTON,
supra note 121, §§ 210, 220.
123. See, e.g., Greenleaf v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 29 Iowa 14 (1870); East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R.
Co. v. Gurley, 80 Tenn. 46 (1883); SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra at 44, §§ 185, 185b; WHARTON,
supra note 121, §§ 206, 208–209.
124. See, e.g., Paulmier v. Erie R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 151 (1870); Gibson v. Pac. R.R. Co., 46 Mo.
163 (1870); Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Platt, 89 Ill. 141 (1878); Ballou v. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul
Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 257, 11 N.W. 559 (1882); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé R.R. Co. v. Ledbetter, 34
Kan. 326 (1885); WHARTON, supra note 121, §§ 209–11.
125. See infra Parts III.C-III.E.
126. CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS
1800–1890 51–120 (1960).
127. 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–1888, pt. 1, at 918–19 (1971); see, e.g., Nichol v. Mayor of
Nashville, 28 Tenn. 252 (1848); Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
128. GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS 82–97 (1971); GOODRICH,
supra note 126, 207–64.
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problem evidenced by the steady stream of tort suits filed by passengers who
had been ejected from trains over fare disputes or had been denied help and
shelter while waiting for trains.129
The end of the 1860s brought both legislative and judicial action. Between
1870 and 1875, Midwestern states enacted a series of “Granger laws” creating
railroad regulatory agencies vested with regulatory powers and limiting rates
and rate discrimination.130 Their supreme courts and ultimately the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the laws, thus laying a foundation for modern regulatory
government in America.131 Midwestern Grangerites included tort law in their
reform efforts. Iowa’s legislature enacted the nation’s first employer liability
law in 1862.132 The law effectively eliminated the fellow-servant rule for
railroads by making them “liable for all damages sustained by any person,
including employes [sic] of the company in consequence of any neglect of the
[company’s] agents”; it also prohibited railroads from forcing workers to waive
injury claims as a condition of employment.133 Wisconsin and Kansas enacted
129. During the 1860s and 1870s, such incidents accounted for nearly ten percent of all tort cases
in Wisconsin and roughly two percent in other survey states. See RANNEY, supra note 84, at Appendix
2. Mark Twain deemed the problem worthy of satire, see MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY
WARNER, THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TO-DAY 316–326 (1901); and Charles Francis Adams Jr., a
descendant of two presidents and a national authority on railroad management, complained publicly
that railroad employees’ manners “are probably the worst and most offensive to be found in the
civilized world.” Charles F. Adams Jr., The Granger Movement, 120 N. AM. REV. 394, 402 (1875).
130. See, e.g., 1871 Ill. Laws 618, 636, 640; 1871 Minn. Laws 78, 84; 1874 Wis. Sess. Laws
599. A number of states, beginning with Massachusetts in 1869, also created railroad commissions
but gave them few regulatory powers. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 408 (1869); CHARLES FRANCIS
ADAMS, JR., RAILROADS: THEIR ORIGIN AND PROBLEMS 138–40 (1878). In 1869 and 1870, the
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa supreme courts, speaking respectively through Chief Justices Thomas
Cooley and Luther Dixon and Justice John F. Dillon—all jurists of national reputation—held, contrary
to prevailing prewar legal opinion, that railroads should be viewed as private rather than public
enterprises and that public subsidies were unconstitutional except in very limited circumstances.
Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 29 (1869), overruled in part by Stewart v. Board of Sup’rs of Polk
City, 30 Iowa 9 (1870), overruled in part by Bonnifield v. Bidwell, 32 Iowa 149 (1871); People ex rel.
Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Township Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 465 (1870); Whiting v. Sheboygan &
Fond du Lac R.R. Co., 25 Wis. 167 (1870).
131. Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80 (1873), aff’d, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see also
Blake v. Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co., 19 Minn. 418 (1872), aff’d, Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co., 94
U.S. 180 (1876); State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. (The Potter Law Case), 35 Wis. 425
(1874); SOLON J. BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION
AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL MANIFESTATIONS 1870–1885 102–08 (1913); MILLER,
supra note 128, at 107–16, 126–31, 161–65; JOSEPH A. RANNEY, WISCONSIN AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICAN LAW 73–78 (2017).
132. 1862 Iowa Acts 197.
133. Id. at 198. In 1856 Georgia had enacted a law, more limited than Iowa’s, that abolished the
fellow-servant rule for train operators “who cannot possibly control those who should exercise care
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similar employer liability laws in 1874.134 The laws did not abolish fault
altogether: railroads could still invoke employee contributory negligence and
assumption of risk as defenses.135 The laws were an important step toward
shifting the cost of accidents to employers, but only a partial one. Legislators
focused exclusively on railroads and gave little thought to eliminating the
fellow-servant rule for other employers.
Railroads challenged all three states’ employer liability laws, arguing that
the laws violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection by singling out
railroads for regulation and that they interfered with railroads’ constitutional
liberty and property rights and their right to contract with employees on terms
of their own choosing.136 All three states’ supreme courts summarily rejected
the challenges, holding that railroads and the safety hazards they posed were
unique in many respects and, therefore, could be the subject of laws limited to
their field.137 They also held that the laws did not violate employers’ liberty,
property or contract rights: those arguments had been dealt with in their earlier
Granger law decisions which affirmed in strong terms state power to regulate
corporations.138 Wisconsin Chief Justice Edward Ryan had warned railroads in
his Granger Law decision that public discontent must be heeded: regulatory
laws were akin to “the surgeon’s wholesome use of the knife, to save life, not
to take it”; and he underscored that warning when he upheld his state’s
employer liability law.139 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed: it upheld Kansas’s
employer liability law in Missouri Pac. Railroad Co. v. Mackey (1888) and
Iowa’s law in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Herrick (1888).140
New American employer liability laws appeared after 1880 when
Parliament enacted a sweeping Employers Liability Act (hereinafter “British
Act”) in response to a decades-long campaign to limit or abolish the fellowand diligence in the running of trains.” 1855–1856 Ga. Laws 155. See Marland C. Hobbs, Statutory
Changes in Employers’ Liability, 2 HARV. L. REV. 212 (1888). The territories of Wyoming and
Montana also enacted early employer liability laws. Montana went the furthest, extending to employees
the enhanced duty of care that railroads owed passengers. 1879 Mont. Sess. Laws 471; 1876 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 512; Hobbs, supra note 133, at 213, 220.
134. 1874 Wis. Sess. Laws 599; 1874 Kan. Sess. Laws 143.
135. See id.; Donald J. Berthrong, Employer’s Liability Legislation in Wisconsin, 1874–1893,
34 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 57, 59–60 (1953).
136. Ditberner v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 47 Wis. 138, 2 N.W. 69 (1879); McAunich
v. Miss. & Mo. R.R. Co., 20 Iowa 338 (1866); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35 (1881).
137. Ditberner, 2 N.W. at 71–72; McAunich, 20 Iowa at 342–43; Haley, 25 Kan. at 38.
138. Ditberner, 2 N.W. at 71.
139. The Potter Law Case, 35 Wis. at 580 (upholding Wisconsin’s Granger law); Ditberner, 2
N.W. at 71.
140. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 6 P. 291 (Kan. 1885), aff’d, Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127
U.S. 205 (1888); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U.S. 210 (1888).
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servant and assumption of risk rules in Great Britain.141 The British Act was
not limited to railroads but applied to a broad variety of industries. It eliminated
common-law defenses available against workers where a worker’s injury
resulted from workplace and equipment defects;142 from negligence of viceprincipals, that is, officials and supervisors with authority to direct workers;143
from a worker’s compliance with a boss’s order or from acts of fellow
employees undertaken in compliance with company rules or a boss’s order;144
or from acts of railroad workers in charge of locomotives, trains and signal
points.145 Alabama adopted the British Act nearly verbatim in 1885146 and
Massachusetts (1887),147 Colorado (1893),148 and Indiana (1893)149 soon
followed suit.
Between 1880 and 1910, approximately nineteen other states and territories
fashioned their own employer liability laws.150 Some states followed the early
Midwestern model by eliminating the fellow-servant rule for specified railroad
personnel, usually engineers, train crews and switch operators.151 Some states
adopted one or two of the 1880 Act’s categories of exemption from the fellowservant rule or combined such categories with codification of other softening
features introduced by American courts.152 Other states took unique paths, most

141. 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42 (Gr. Brit.); see CONRAD RENO, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACTS 363–77 (1896).
142. 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42, § 1(1) (Gr. Brit.); see ALFRED HENRY RUEGG, K.C., THE
EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT, 1880, AND THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906, 523–24, 544
(7th ed. 1907).
143. 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42 §§ 1(2), 1(3) (Gr. Brit.).
144. Id. at § 1(4); 1902 Ohio Laws 114 (doctrine inapplicable to vice-principals’ negligence;
employers liable for workplace defects).
145. 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42 § 1(5) (Gr. Brit.).
146. 1885 Ala. Laws 115.
147. 1887 Mass. Acts 899.
148. 1893 Colo. Sess. Laws, 129.
149. 1893 Ind. Acts 294; see RENO, supra note 141, at 375–77.
150. See infra notes 152–155; see generally CARROLL D. WRIGHT, TENTH SPECIAL REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR: LABOR LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH DECISIONS OF COURTS
RELATING THERETO (1904).
151. See 1891 Fla. Laws 113; LA. STATS. ANN. § 2320 (1897); 1887 Minn. Laws 69; 1897 Mo.
Laws 96; 1897 N.C. Sess. Laws 108; 1903 N.D. Laws 202; 1903 Or. Laws 20; 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws
14.
152. See 1893 Ark. Acts 68; 1901 Ariz. Sess. Laws 734; (fellow-servant rule inapplicable if the
employer had prior notice of the fellow worker’s incompetency); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1970 (Deering
1909) (rule inapplicable if fellow-servant hiring was negligent); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4702 (1901)
(inapplicable to vice-principal’s negligence); 1893 N.M. Laws 43–44 (similar to Arizona law); 1902
Ohio Laws 114 (similar to New York law); 1903 Or. Laws 20 (rule inapplicable to negligence of vice-
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notably Maryland. In 1902, it abolished the fellow-servant rule for miners and
quarry and streetcar workers and provided that they could recover half the value
of their injuries from their employer even if they were contributorily
negligent.153 Employers would be exempted from the law if they agreed to pay
premiums to a benefit fund administered by the state insurance commissioner
for workers killed in accidents, or if they created a company death-benefit fund
approved by the commissioner.154 None of the Midwestern states that had
pioneered employer liability statutes for railroads expanded their statutes to
apply to all industries in line with the British model. That seems curious, but it
is consistent with a broader American pattern: most states that enacted
employer liability laws created basic statutes reflecting their choice among
these options and then left them in place making only marginal adjustments in
subsequent legislative sessions. 155

principals and railroad crew members); S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 15 (similar to Oregon law; doctrine also
inapplicable to workers in different departments); VA. CONST. art. XII, § 162 (similar to South Carolina
law).
153. George E. Barnett, The Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act, 16 Q. J. Econ. 591, 591
(1902).
154. 1902 Md. Laws 219. In 1904 a lower state court struck down the law on the ground that it
impermissibly delegated legislative power to the commissioner and deprived employers of the right to
a jury trial. The decision was not appealed, and no further reform took place in Maryland until the
advent of workers compensation. Id.; George E. Barnett, The End of the Maryland Workmen’s
Compensation Act, 19 Q. J. ECON. 320, 320–22 (1905). In 1890, Mississippi codified the vice-principal
and departmental exceptions to the fellow-servant rule and abolished the assumption-of-risk defense
except for conductors and engineers. MISS. CONST. art. II, § 193. In 1903, Montana codified the viceprincipal and departmental exceptions and applied them to miners as well as railroad workers. 1903
Mont. Laws 157.
155. Wisconsin was a rare exception. See 1880 Wis. Sess. Laws 270–71 (repealing 1874 law);
1889 Wis. Sess. Laws 613 (rule not applicable to acts of certain railroad supervisors and equipment
operators); 1893 Wis. Sess. Laws 263 (same); 1903 Wis. Sess. Laws 741 (rule not applicable to any
accidents that involved “risk or hazard peculiar to the operation of railroads.”). Labor unions were the
main force behind the 1880s renaissance, but it also drew support from conservatives such as Frank
Flower, the head of the state’s Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, who “f[ou]nd a sentiment in
favor” of reinstating the old law and argued that “[o]ur laws as well as justice should keep pace with
the advance of civilization.” FRANK A. FLOWER, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS 1885–1886 xlv-xlvi (1886) [hereinafter “WBLIS”]. A
Progressive-dominated legislature enacted the 1903 expansion at Governor Robert La Follette’s behest.
S. JOURNAL, 46th Sess., at 97–98 (Wis. 1903); see generally Berthrong, supra note 135, at 60–68.
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The Evolution of Employer Liability Laws, 1860–1904 156
(Map generated from a template provided by courtesy of mapchart.net)

Post-1880 employer liability laws continued to elicit constitutional
challenges, usually on the ground that the lines they drew between covered and
non-covered workers violated federal and state constitutions’ equal-protection
clauses. American courts rejected most of these challenges. The U.S. Supreme
Court effectively put an end to challenges to laws limited to railroad employees
in 1888 in Mackey and Herrick.157 In Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western Railway
Co. (1899), the federal high Court upheld Indiana’s law adopting the 1880
British Act’s classifications,158 and courts in several other states with laws

156. See Wright, supra note 150; RENO, supra note 141, both passim. The figure is based on
information in these sources.
157. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888); Herrick, 127 U.S. 210 (1888). Later statutes that varied from
the Iowa and Kansas employer liability laws in minor respects were challenged but were upheld by
state supreme courts based on Mackey and Herrick. See, e.g., Coley v. N.C. R.R. Co., 40 S.E. 195
(1901); Bodie v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co., 39 S.E. 715 (S.C. 1901); Lewis v. N. Pac. Ry.
Co., 92 P. 469, 472 (Mont. 1907); RENO, supra note 141, § 84; John Fabian Witt, The Long History of
State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1181–82 (2005).
158. Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co., 175 U.S. 348, 353–54 (1899).
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based on the 1880 Act rejected challenges to those laws based on Tullis.159 A
few employer liability laws did not survive challenge. In 1903 Mississippi’s
supreme court struck down a law that abolished the fellow-servant rule for all
corporations, concluding that the law’s omission of individual employers was
unconstitutionally arbitrary, but it agreed that employer liability laws could
validly target railroads and other businesses that involved a special degree of
hazard.160
Employer liability laws that survived constitutional challenges were
sometimes cabined by narrow judicial construction. Courts uniformly held that
the laws did not eliminate contributory negligence as a defense.161 Some
liability laws codified the grace-period rule, but courts enforced those laws
grudgingly indicating, as they had before enactment of the laws,162 that worker
protections would not apply if the hazard posed an imminent threat of injury,
and that grace periods would not extend indefinitely.163
D. Anti-Waiver Statutes
Many legislatures also responded to the changed workplace conditions of
the Second Industrial Revolution by enacting anti-waiver statutes. During the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many American railroads
established worker benefit plans, participation in which was often compulsory,
or informally provided temporary support for injured workers and their
families, and some also provided jobs for permanently disabled workers.164
They did so out of paternalism and out of a desire to avoid the costs and risks
of litigation, but they and other employers also tried to protect themselves by
inserting waiver clauses in their workers’ contracts.165 These included
absolute-waiver clauses requiring workers as a condition of employment to
waive all right to file lawsuits in case of injury and benefit-receipt clauses

159. See, e.g., Ryalls v. Mechanics’ Mills, 22 N.E. 766 (Mass. 1889); Colo. Milling & Elevator
Co. v. Mitchell, 58 P. 28, 30 (Colo. 1899); Quigley v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. of N.J., 79 A. 458, 462
(N.J. 1911).
160. Ballard v. Miss. Cotton Oil Co., 34 So. 533, 557 (Miss. 1903); Bradford Constr. Co. v.
Heflin, 42 So. 174, 178 (Miss. 1906). Indiana’s supreme court agreed. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough,
80 N.E. 529, 530 (Ind. 1907).
161. See, e.g., Mobile & Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Holborn, 84 Ala. 133, 137 (1887), overruled in
part by Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Allen, 13 So. 8 (1892); Daugherty v. Midland Steel Co., 53
N.E. 844, 847 (Ind. App. 1899); see also RENO, supra note 141, § 113.
162. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Kroy v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Iowa 357 (1871); Indianapolis & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Watson, 14 N.E. 721, 728 (Ind. 1887); see also RENO, supra note 141, §§ 218, 239.
164. WITT, supra note 95, at 35–41; Kaczorowski, supra note 68, 298–301.
165. Kaczorowski, supra note 68, at 268–69, 289, 292.
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requiring workers to waive such rights if they accepted the guaranteed but
limited benefits that company plans provided.166
Nineteenth-century British courts generally upheld both types of clauses as
consistent with free-labor principles of liberty of contract,167 but American
legislatures and courts gave the clauses a cooler reception. Between 1860 and
1910, at least nineteen states enacted anti-waiver statutes prohibiting absolutewaiver clauses and, in some cases, benefit-receipt clauses.168 American courts
generally upheld benefit-receipt clauses in the absence of prohibitory
statutes,169 but many struck down absolute-waiver clauses even in the absence
of statutes, reasoning that because they required workers to give up legal rights
that had not yet sprung into existence, they were contrary to public policy and
void.170 Judicial hostility to absolute-waiver clauses insulated prohibitory
statutes that were limited to such clauses from any serious constitutional
challenge, but American courts divided over benefit-receipt clauses. Some
courts upheld state statutes banning benefit-receipt clauses, stating that such
clauses were against public policy because they required workers to elect a
remedy prior to injury without providing any immediate benefit in return.171
Other courts enforced benefit-receipt clauses, reasoning that benefit election
operated as a voluntary settlement between employers and workers.172 In 1908,
Congress explicitly banned use of benefit-receipt clauses by railroads engaged
166. One scholar has concluded that after 1880, railroads and their employees inclined more
toward litigation. Railroads did so because of increasing pressure to reduce costs and increase
efficiency; workers did so because they feared that acceptance of paternalistic benefits would threaten
their independence and bargaining power as to other issues. Id. at 266–78, 282–98.
167. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q.B. Div. 357, 357 (1882); Clements v. London &
Nw. Ry. Co., 2 Q.B. (Eng.) 482 (Eng.1894).
168. See, e.g., 1893 Wis. Sess. Laws 263; 1903 Wis. Sess. Laws 741. See also, e.g., COLO.
CONST. art. XV, § 15 (1876); 1891 Fla. Laws 113–14; 1895 Ga. Laws 292; 1902 Mass. Acts 918;
MISS. CONST. art II, § 193 (1890); MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (1889); 1903 N.D. Laws 171; 1903
Or. Laws 20; 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 14; VA. CONST. art. XII, § 162 (1902); WYO. CONST. art. XIX, § 7
(1890).
169. See, e.g., Graft v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 8 A. 206 (Pa. 1887); Spitze v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.
Co., 23 A. 307 (Md. 1892); Eckman v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 48 N.E. 496 (Ill. 1897);
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Bell, 62 N.W. 314 (Neb. 1895); Beck v. Pa. R.R. Co., 43 A.
908 (N.J. 1899).
170. See, e.g., Kan. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. 169 (1883); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co.
v. Spangler, 8 N.E. 467 (Ohio 1886); Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. Co. v. Eubanks, 3 S.W. 808 (Ark.
1887); Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 11 S.E. 829 (Va. 1890); Hissong v.
Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 8 So. 776 (Ala. 1891); see also RENO, supra note 141, §§ 7–9.
171. See, e.g., Pa. Co. v. Chapman, 77 N.E. 248 (Ill. 1905); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v.
Beazley, 45 So. 761, 793 (Fla. 1907); Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 67 S.E. 971, 975 (N.C.
1910).
172. See, e.g., Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Cox, 45 N.E. 641 (Ohio 1896);
Colaizzi v. Pa. R.R. Co., 101 N.E. 859 (N.Y. 1913).
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in interstate commerce, which led to a sharp reduction in their use.173 The U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the 1908 law and nearly all state courts followed its lead
thereafter.174
E. Safety Statutes
Workplace safety statutes arose in tandem with employer liability laws.
Between 1870 and 1910, most states, particularly those at an advanced stage of
industrialization, enacted safety laws, but they did so in piecemeal fashion.
Early laws were directed at isolated problems and were often enacted in
reaction to a particularly bad factory fire or explosion.175 Less industrialized
states did not enact workplace safety laws until the twentieth century,176 and no
state would attempt to create a comprehensive industrial safety code until 1911
when Wisconsin established an Industrial Commission charged with preparing
and enforcing such a code.177 Like the core tort concepts of fault-based liability
and contributory negligence, the piecemeal approach to safety was a product of
the era’s focus on individual responsibility. That focus also shaped the early
work of state labor bureaus, most of which were empowered only to monitor
workplace conditions and suggest improvements; very few lawmakers were
prepared to give the bureaus power to create and enforce safety regulations.178
Though early safety statutes were sketchy, still they were available for
enforcement. Beginning in the 1880s, the question arose whether violation of
such statutes would impose absolute liability on employers in case of worker
injury, or whether employers could still assert contributory negligence as a
173. 35 Stat. 149 (1908); see Am. Law Reports, Validity of Contract Providing that Acceptance
of Benefits from Relief Association Shall Bar Action Against Employer, 12 A.L.R. 477, 494–95 (1921).
174. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 574–75 (1911); see Am.
Law Reports, supra note 173, 494–95 and cases there cited.
175. New York and Wisconsin provide good examples. See 1886 N.Y. Laws 629; 1887 N.Y.
Laws 575; 1889 N.Y. Laws 752 (fire escape law, enacted after an 1889 factory fire killed thirty-eight
people); Fred R. Fairchild, The Factory Legislation of the State of New York, 6 PUBS. OF AM. ECON.
ASS’N 29–35, 44–56, 78–80 (1905); 1878 Wis. Sess. Laws 424; 1885 Wis. Sess. Laws 42, 346, 213
(fire escape laws enacted after an 1883 Milwaukee hotel fire killed seventy-one people); 3 ROBERT C.
NESBIT, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN: URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 1873–1893 452
(William F. Thompson ed. 1985).
176. See, e.g., 1908 N.C. Sess. Laws xi-xviii; 1911 Tex. Gen. Laws iii-vii; and see table of
contents in 1905 CAL. CIV. CODE.
177. 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 581; see Donald W. Rogers, From Common Law to Factory Laws:
The Transformation of Workplace Safety Law in Wisconsin Before Progressivism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 177, 207, 210 (1995).
178. 3 JOHN R. COMMONS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896–1932 628 (1935);
see FAIRCHILD, supra note 175, at 24–27; A. J. ALTMEYER, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
WISCONSIN: A CASE STUDY IN LABOR LAW ADMINISTRATION 13 (1932); Rogers, supra note 177, at
196–97.
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defense.179 American courts had useful precedents to look to: during the 1860s
and 1870s, many had considered that question in the context of statutes
requiring railroads to fence their rights of way.180 Several state supreme courts
had interpreted their fencing statutes to impose absolute liability on railroads
whose failure to fence led to livestock and crossing accidents;181 others refused
to go that far, holding that violation of fencing statutes was sufficient to
establish negligence on the railroad’s part but that contributory negligence was
still a defense,182 and in some cases holding that imposition of absolute liability
regardless of fault would be unconstitutional.183
The courts divided over the effect of workplace safety laws in much the
same manner. Most held that workplace safety laws did not bar use of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk defenses against injured adult
workers unless the laws contained explicit wording to that effect,184 but some
were not so reluctant: they liberally construed safety statutes to preclude
employers from asserting contributory negligence and assumption of risk based
on building and equipment defects.185 Those defenses, said Kansas Justice
Henry Mason, were at bottom based on a worker’s express or implied
agreement to be responsible for the risks that attended unsafe machinery, and
such an agreement could hardly be said to exist if the legislature had placed that
responsibility on the employer through a safety statute.186 Many courts that
allowed contributory negligence and assumption of risk as defenses to claims
179. See infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
181. Shepard v. Buffalo, N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 641, 644 (1866). Other early cases
upholding absolute liability included Jeffersonville, Madison & Indianapolis R.R Co. v. Ross, 37 Ind.
545, 549 (1871) and Wilder v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 65 Me. 332, 340 (1876); see also, e.g., Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Crider, 19 S.W. 618, 622 (Tenn. 1892).
182. See, e.g., Curry v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 43 Wis. 665, 671–73 (1878); Jolliffe v. Brown, 44
P. 149, 152 (Wash. 1896). After Curry was decided, Wisconsin’s legislature amended the state’s
fencing law to preclude contributory negligence as a defense. 1881 Wis. Sess. Laws 221; see
Quackenbush v. Wis. & Mich. R.R. Co., 62 Wis. 411, 415–17, 22 N.W. 519, 519–21 (1885) (upholding
1881 law).
183. See, e.g., Zeigler v. South & N. Ala. R.R. Co., 58 Ala. 594, 599 (1877); Bielenberg v. Mont.
Union Ry. Co., 20 P. 314, 316 (Mont. 1889); see also Witt, State Constitutions and Tort Law, 1177–
78.
184. See, e.g., Thompson v. Edward P. Allis Co., 89 Wis. 523, 528, 62 N.W. 527, 529 (1895);
Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N.Y. 372, 379 (1896); Langlois v. Dunn Worsted Mills, 57 A. 910, 911 (R.I.
1904); Mika v. Passaic Print Works, 70 A. 327, 329 (N.J. 1908); Jones v. Am. Caramel Co., 74 A. 613,
614 (Pa. 1909).
185. W. Furniture & Mfg. Co. v. Bloom, 90 P. 821 (Kan. 1907); see also, e.g., Kilpatrick v.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 52 A. 531, 533–34 (Vt. 1902) and Narramore v. Cleveland, Cincinnati., Chi. &
St. Louis R.R. Co., 96 F. 298, 300–02 (6th Cir. 1899).
186. Western Furniture & Mfg. Co., 90 P. at 822–23.
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by adult workers made an exception for claims by children against employers
who hired them in violation of minimum-age statutes,187 although a minority,
led by Massachusetts, did not, holding that use of liability defenses against
children would not be barred unless that was explicitly provided by statute.188
In sum, by the dawn of the twentieth century, most American legislatures
and courts had accepted that pure contributory negligence was not a good fit
for a maturing industrial economy and had taken action to soften its harsh
effects. But injured workers and other accident victims still faced high hurdles
to recovery, and their chances of compensation were still highly uncertain and
varied from state to state. However, the Progressive Movement was rapidly
gaining strength in American political and legal circles, and the state of tort law
was about to change dramatically.
IV. THE CAMPAIGN FOR WORKERS COMPENSATION
A. Origins of Workers Compensation
Workers’ compensation originated in Europe. In 1884, German Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck created the world’s first compensation system that
abandoned the concept of fault in the workplace. The system was compulsory;
it was funded by employers’ mutual insurance associations and administered
by workers’ sickness associations.189 Unions and employer associations were
powerful forces in German politics, and Bismarck hoped the new system would
defuse worker discontent and promote cooperation between the two groups,
which was essential to his goal of making Germany a world power.190 Great
Britain continued to rely on its 1880 Employers Liability Act, but criticism of

187. See, e.g., Marino v. Lehmaier, 66 N.E. 572, 574 (N.Y. 1903); Perry v. Tozer, 97 N. W. 137,
140 (Minn. 1903); Ornamental Iron & Wire Co. v. Green, 65 S.W. 399, 401 (Tenn. 1901); Sipes v.
Mich. Starch Co., 100 N.W. 447, 448 (Mich. 1904); Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Armentraut, 73 N.E.
766, 768 (Ill. 1905); Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 218 Pa. 311, 314 (1907); Leathers v.
Blackwell’s Durham Tobacco Co., 57 S. E. 11, 13 (N.C. 1907); Sanitary Laundry Co. v. Adams, 208
S.W. 6, 7 (Ky. 1919) (collecting cases). See generally LINDLEY D. CLARK, THE LAW OF THE
EMPLOYMENT OF LABOR 126 (1911).
188. Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, 95 N.E. 876, 879 (Mass. 1911); see also, e.g., Sterling
v. Union Carbide Co., 105 N.W. 755, 757 (Mich. 1905); Rolin v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 53 S.E.
891, 896 (N.C. 1906). See also Note, Construction of Child Labor Statutes, 23 YALE L.J. 175, 176–
77 (1913) (criticizing the Marino decision and arguing that no exception should be made unless
explicitly stated in a child-labor statute).
189. Michael L. Perlin, The German and British Roots of American Workers’ Compensation
Systems: When is an “Intentional Act” “Intentional?”, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 849, 855 (1985). P.
Tecumseh Sherman, Can the German Workmen’s Insurance Law Be Adapted to American
Conditions?, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 68–70 (1912).
190. Sherman, supra note 189, at 68–70.
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the British Act’s patchwork nature grew steadily, and in 1897 Parliament
enacted a workers compensation system which superseded the Act.191
Parliamentary supporters of the new system, including Joseph Chamberlain and
future prime minister Herbert Asquith, stressed that accidents should be viewed
as an inevitability rather than as a product of carelessness, and they used a
military analogy that was to become popular among American reformers.192 “If
a soldier in the army of industry is wounded or dies he is entitled in the one case
to a pension, and in the other case that his dependents are to be provided for,”
said Asquith, and “you cannot leave the application of that principle to the
hazard chance, as to whether the captain of the company is solvent or
insolvent.”193 The 1897 English law was limited to railroad workers and other
selected occupations, but it was extended to nearly all workers in 1906.194
Participation in the new system was compulsory: employers were made liable
for worker injuries regardless of fault, and workers were foreclosed from
bringing suit under the common law.195
A good argument can be made that the American workers compensation
movement originated with Carroll Wright. Wright was born into an uppermiddle-class New England family in 1840.196 Like other members of his class,
he viewed the labor movement with more detachment than sympathy; but as a
devout Universalist, he believed in humanity’s ability to progress toward
perfection, and he viewed statistical study and social science as keys to that
perfection.197 Wright’s background made him a near-perfect exemplar of the
professionals and reform-minded businessmen, devout believers in rationality
and expertise as the keys to good government and social prosperity and security,
who were a core element of the Progressive coalition.198 In 1873, Wright was
appointed to head Massachusetts’s Bureau of Labor Statistics; he soon made
191. W. ADDINGTON WILLIS, THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906 611 (18th ed.
1919); J.D. BECK, THIRTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
STATISTICS, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1907–1908 122–34 (Chamberlain), 134–43 (Asquith) [hereinafter
“1907–1908 WBLIS REPORT”].
192. 1907–1908 WBLIS REPORT, supra note 191, at 134.
193. Id. at 138.
194. WILLIS, supra note 191; Id. at 3.
195. WILLIS, supra note 191; Id. at 3; see generally Sherman, supra note 189, at 68–72; 66 The
Contemporary Review, Employers’ Liability, 66 CONTEMP. REV. 137 (1894); 1907–1908 WBLIS
REPORT, supra note 191, at 121–37; R. Newton Crane, Personal Injury Actions and Workmen’s
Compensation in England, 18 GREEN BAG 216, 217 (1906).
196. JAMES LEIBY, CARROLL WRIGHT AND LABOR REFORM: THE ORIGIN OF LABOR
STATISTICS 7 (1960).
197. Id. at 12–15.
198. See CHARLES MCCARTHY, THE WISCONSIN IDEA 162 (1912); HERBERT CROLY,
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 397 (1914).
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the bureau a leader in the study and quantitative measurement of industrial
conditions.199 In 1882, his bureau undertook a study of employer liability laws
at the legislature’s request;200 the project sparked Wright’s interest, and in 1892,
after becoming the U.S. Commissioner of Labor, he commissioned a federal
study of the German workers compensation system. The study recommended
that Americans wait to see if the German system would succeed before
proceeding with similar reform, but Wright emphasized that the subject was
important, and the study attracted national attention.201
In 1898, the Bureau sponsored William Willoughby’s Workingmen’s
Insurance, the first treatise that squarely advocated the adoption of workers
compensation systems in America and explained how that might be done.202 At
the same time, the influential Social Reform Club of New York City made its
own study of workers compensation and prepared a bill for a rudimentary form
of no-fault compensation that was introduced in New York’s 1898 legislature,
although it was tabled.203 In 1903, the Massachusetts legislature asked Wright,
now back in his home state, to head a committee to propose legislation; the
following year, Wright and his fellow members proposed a no-fault
compensation plan that would give workers “a more certain, even if more
moderate, compensation” than would litigation under existing employer
liability laws.204 Wright made the point that many industrial accidents were the
result of bad luck, not employer or worker fault, and that traditional tort law
fault concepts were not adequate to meet the social problem of industrial
accidents.205 The Wright committee’s report to the 1903 Massachusetts
legislature marked an inflection point. Even though the committee failed to
persuade lawmakers to adopt workers compensation, its report marked the first
time a comprehensive system had been directly recommended to a legislature,

199. LEIBY, supra note 196, at 28–32, 62–65.
200. 1882 Mass. Acts 242; COMMONS, supra note 178, at 628; J.E. Rhodes, The Inception of
Workmen’s Compensation in the United States, 11 ME. L. REV. 35, 35–37 (1917).
201. LEIBY, supra note 196, at 110–13; JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS, FOURTH SPECIAL REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR: COMPULSORY INSURANCE IN GERMANY 13–14 (1895); Rhodes,
supra note 200, at 38–39.
202. Rhodes, supra note 200, at 41–42; WILLIAM FRANKLIN WILLOUGHBY, WORKINGMEN’S
INSURANCE 328–59 (1898).
203. Rhodes, supra note 200, at 39–40.
204. 1903 Mass. Acts 57; COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS
BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE 44–45 (1904) [hereinafter “Massachusetts 1904 Committee
Report”]; LEIBY, supra note 196, at 69–80; WITT, supra note 95, at 10–11.
205. Massachusetts 1904 Committee Report, supra note 204, at 44–45.
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and Wright’s reputation caused lawmakers in Massachusetts and elsewhere to
take notice.206
B. The Movement Gains Strength
The workers compensation movement accelerated after 1904, both in state
capitals and in the forum of public opinion. The American Association for
Labor Legislation (AALL) and the National Civic Federation, influential
organizations that counted both reformers and industrialists as members,
concluded that workers compensation provided a better answer to the
workplace-accident crisis than existing tort law, and they began promoting
workers compensation throughout the nation; they were soon joined by the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).207 Articles describing the
hazards workers faced in industries such as coal, steel, and railroads; the
prevalence and human cost of accidents; and the failings of existing employer
liability law began to appear regularly in popular magazines such as Outlook,
McClure’s, and Overland that were sympathetic to Progressive causes.208
Scholarly journals and highbrow general-circulation magazines such as Atlantic
Monthly and North American Review also educated their readers about the
nature and advantages of workers compensation,209 and the New York Charity
Organization Society published supportive articles in its Charities and The
Commons magazine (later renamed Survey).210 Theodore Roosevelt also

206. Id. at 44–46; 1903 Mass. Acts 57; LEIBY, supra note 196, at 123–30; WITT, supra note 95,
at 10–11.
207. James Weinstein, Big Business and the Origins of Workmen’s Compensation, 8 LAB. HIST.
156, 162–65 (1967); Robert Asher, Workmen’s Compensation in the United States, 1880–1935 190–
220 (1971) (June 1921) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota) (on file with the University
Microfilms); COMMONS, supra note 178, at 570–72.
208. See, e.g., Clarence H. Mark, Waste Heap of Industry, 49 OVERLAND MONTHLY 123 (Feb.
1907); Arthur B. Reeve, Is Workmen’s Compensation Practicable?, 85 OUTLOOK 508, 509 (Mar. 2,
1907); John Graham Brooks, Moralized Insurance, 39 COLLIER’S MAG. 25 (June 15, 1907); Launcelot
Packer, The Hazards of Industry: Should the Workman Bear the Whole Burden?, 92 OUTLOOK 319,
319–20 (June 5, 1909); John M. Gitterman, The Cruelties of Our Courts, 35 MCCLURE’S MAG. 151,
152–54 (June 1910).
209. See, e.g., Frank A. Vanderlip, Insurance for Working-Men, 181 N. AM. REV. 921, 922–32
(1905); Josiah Strong, Our Industrial Juggernaut, 183 N. AM. REV. 1030, 1030–32 (1906); Frank W.
Lewis, Employers’ Liability, 103 ATL. MONTHLY 57 (1909); Frank W. Taussig, Workmen’s Insurance
in Germany: Some Illustrative Figures, 24 Q. J. ECON. 191, 193 (1909); see also Epaphroditus Peck,
The Massachusetts Proposition for an Employers’ Compensation Act, 14 YALE L.J. 18, 18–19 (1904);
Ernst Freund, Constitutional Aspects of Employers’ Liability Legislation, 19 GREEN BAG 80, 80–83
(1907).
210. See, e.g., Crystal Eastman, The Temper of the Workers Under Trial, 21 CHARITIES AND THE
COMMONS 561 (Jan. 2, 1909); Crystal Eastman, A Year’s Work Accidents and Their Costs, 21
CHARITIES & COMMONS 1147 (1909).
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supported the cause in speeches and articles, most notably in a 1907 speech
given at the tricentennial celebration of the founding of Jamestown and in a
1908 special message to Congress.211
Reformers who shared Carroll Wright’s love of data also contributed to the
campaign. New York’s labor statistics bureau presented a brief statistical study
of accident rates in hazardous occupations in its 1899 annual report,212 and
Wisconsin’s bureau devoted more than one hundred pages of its 1904 report to
an article by Milwaukee attorney William D. Kerr, who compiled existing
statistical literature and presented a shocking picture of the high rates of injury
and death in various industries.213 Kerr recognized that some American critics
viewed workers compensation, particularly compulsory workers compensation,
as socialistic, but he argued that the public must bear the cost of accidents in
any event, whether through increased product prices or taxation, and that
workers compensation system would greatly reduce the transactional costs
exacted by predatory plaintiffs’ lawyers and profit-hungry insurers.214 Kerr
also appealed to labor. He recognized that many workers still considered
themselves craftsmen and viewed workers compensation as carrying a taint of
government paternalism and charity, and he implored them to move beyond
that view: compensation for industrial accidents was “an item distinctly apart
from wages,” a social obligation to labor at a time when labor, “through no fault
of its own, [could be] overtaken by adverse circumstances which are beyond its
means to regulate.”215
Momentum continued to build. In 1905, an Illinois legislative committee
addressed an issue that would give reformers continuing concern: whether
employers and workers should be compelled to participate in workers
compensation systems or whether participation should be voluntary.216 The
Illinois committee’s report raised concerns about the constitutionality of a
compulsory system: imposing liability for accidents on employers regardless of
fault and depriving both sides of the right to litigate might be viewed by judges

211. Rhodes, supra note 200, at 48; WITT, supra note 95, at 3.
212. JNO. MCMAKIN, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
564–65 (1900).
213. HALFORD ERICKSON, ELEVENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR AND
INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1903–1904 425–27 [hereinafter “WBLIS, 1903–04
REPORT”].
214. Id. at 452. Kerr noted that in the United States, 70 percent of employers’ insurance
premiums went to pay administrative costs but in Germany, only 23 percent did. Id. at 526.
215. Id. at 538.
216. Charles R. Henderson, WORKINGMEN’S INSURANCE IN ILLINOIS in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, AM. ASSN. FOR LABOR LEGIS. 69–84 (1908); 1907–1908 WBLIS REPORT,
supra note 191, at 117–20.
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as an infringement of liberty and property rights and of the right to try disputes
to a jury.217 The committee recommended that any Illinois law be voluntary,
but it also prepared and attached to its report a model law for a compulsory
system.218 The Illinois legislature did not enact either proposal, but the
committee’s model law was widely circulated and proved useful to other
legislatures.219
In 1907, Wisconsin’s bureau published a new statistical study of industrial
accidents in its state.220 The study bore the stamp of University of Wisconsin
professor John Commons, a nationally recognized authority on industrial
economics and labor reform who was gaining recognition as one of the leading
intellectual lights of Progressivism.221 Commons had come to view workplace
accidents as an inevitable byproduct of industrial capitalism and had adopted
workers compensation as a part of his decades-long crusade to “save Capitalism
by making it good,” and he now presented a detailed economic calculation in
the Wisconsin bureau’s 1907 Report showing that workers compensation
would deliver more benefit to workers at lower cost to employers than the
traditional tort system.222
The momentum for reform reached critical mass in 1909. In that year,
Wisconsin’s bureau published another study sympathetic to workers
compensation;223 Minnesota’s bureau published an article similar to Kerr’s
1904 article, with statistics for its state;224 and Crystal Eastman made her first
appearance on the national reform stage.225 Eastman came from a world similar
217. Rhodes, supra note 200, at 46–47; see WITT, supra note 95, at 137.
218. 1907–1908 WBLIS REPORT, supra note 191, at 117–20; see Henderson, supra note 216, at
79.
219. Rhodes, supra note 200, at 46–47; Henderson, supra note 216, at 80–81.
220. 1907–1908 WBLIS REPORT, supra note 191, at 2–70.
221. Id. at 1 (footnote); JOHN R. COMMONS, MYSELF 101–06, 140–43 (1934); MAXWELL, supra
note 13, at 80–82; JAMES LEIBY, A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK IN THE UNITED
STATES 122 (1978).
222. 1907–1908 WBLIS REPORT, supra note 191, at 2–70; see also REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1909–1910 71–72 [hereinafter “1909–
1910 WBLIS REPORT”]; COMMONS, supra note 221, at 143. The Bureau found that fifty-two percent
of all accidents surveyed were due to hazards of the industry; twenty-three percent and eleven percent
were the fault of workers and employers respectively; in seven percent, both employer and worker
were at fault; and six percent were due to the negligence of fellow servants. 1907–1908 WBLIS
REPORT, supra note 191, at 2.
223. 1909–1910 WBLIS REPORT, supra note 222, at 71–72.
224. GEORGE T. SIMPSON, BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE GOVERNOR
OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 144–64 (1910).
225. See Eastman, The Temper of the Workers Under Trial, supra note 210 at 561; Eastman, A
year’s Work Accidents and their Costs, supra note 210, at 1147; CRYSTAL EASTMAN, “EMPLOYERS’
LIABILITY”: A CRITICISM BASED ON FACTS (1909).
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to Wright’s, but she brought an element of intimacy and feeling to her reform
work that Wright lacked. Raised in Massachusetts and New York in a family
of reform-minded activists, she was a member of the first generation of
American women given a genuine opportunity to make their mark in the
professions.226 After earning graduate degrees in sociology and law, she
attracted the attention of the Russell Sage Foundation, and was hired to work
on a survey of industrial conditions in Pittsburgh’s steel mills.227 The Pittsburgh
Survey became a model for other social research projects, and after recounting
her findings in a series of magazine articles, Eastman published Work Accidents
and the Law (1910), generally regarded as the Survey’s most influential
report.228 Work Accidents was unlike anything previously seen in reform
literature. Eastman combined statistical and policy analysis with stories of the
post-accident lives of individual workers and their families, stories told in an
intimate style that spoke of the poverty and desperation that followed in the
wake of injuries.229 The book’s impact was enhanced by its tasteful typeface
and layout; by drawings and photographs of affected workers and families
created by Joseph Stella and Lewis Hine, both major American artists;230 and
by its dramatic statistical illustrations, including a “death calendar” showing the
number of work-related deaths in Pittsburgh each day from July 1906 through
June 1907 and a statue of a worker diagrammed to show the average
compensation paid for each limb lost in an industrial accident.231 Work
Accidents brought the problem of industrial injuries home to upper-middleclass Americans without whose support change could not occur, and it added
weight to arguments for workers compensation in ways that Wright and others
who wrote in a more masculine style could not match.232
226. AMY ARONSON, CRYSTAL EASTMAN: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE 17–40 (2020).
227. Id. at 41–48, 51–57, 61.
228. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (Paul Underwood Kellogg ed.,
1910); ARONSON, supra note 226, at 69–96.
229. EASTMAN, supra note 228, at 11–118; WITT, supra note 95, at 126–30; JASON PUSKAR,
ACCIDENT SOCIETY: FICTION, COLLECTIVITY, AND THE PRODUCTION OF CHANCE 154–62, 176–83
(2012); Ruth Crocker, From Gift to Foundation: The Philanthropic Lives of Mrs. Russell Sage, in
CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 119, 211–12, 236–37 (Lawrence J.
Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie eds., 2003).
230. See EASTMAN, supra note 228, at xi-xii (list of illustrations and photos).
231. Id., frontispiece 126.
232. Wright’s work on workers compensation was secondary to his other work in statistics, labor
relations and education and came near the end of his life. He died in 1909 and did not see the reform
he had advocated six years earlier come to fruition. Eastman’s life turned in a different direction after
1910. She moved to Wisconsin in 1912 to work on an unsuccessful campaign for women’s suffrage;
she then returned to New York, where she became an important figure in national women’s-rights,
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By 1910, hardly any writers were still defending existing employer liability
systems. Labor leaders such as the United Mine Workers’ John Mitchell had
overcome their initial skepticism of reform: they concluded that trading
accident litigation rights for guaranteed, if limited, compensation would likely
benefit workers, and for the first time they openly favored workers
compensation.233 Many American business associations had reached the same
conclusions as the AALL and NAM, and they too turned their energies toward
shaping new systems rather than opposing them.234
Most strikingly, a handful of judges temporarily abandoned the formal
neutrality that their position required; they openly expressed their unhappiness
with existing employer liability laws and their desire for change. Wisconsin
Justice Roujet Marshall provided the most notable example.235 Marshall was
devoted to free-labor principles; he consistently applied a critical eye to
Progressive reform measures and defended his court against charges that it
favored employers over injured workers,236 but he became increasingly
frustrated with the harsh results that existing tort law often produced in
workplace-accident cases.237 In Houg v. Girard Lumber Co. (1910),238
Marshall and his colleagues overturned a jury verdict in favor of a lumber-mill
worker whose foot had been caught and mangled in a sprocket, holding that the
evidence compelled a finding of contributory negligence, but Marshall added
an appendix in which he lamented the result and bluntly made the case for
workers compensation:
Why [should] not inevitable incidents of activities upon which
all depend to satisfy demands of legitimate human desire, be
laid at once upon the subjects of consumption where they must
in the end inevitably go for final liquidation? . . . Why should
not the sacrifices for all be taken at once as the burdens of all;
pacifist and civil liberties circles before her untimely death in 1928. LEIBY, supra note 196, at 123–
206; ARONSON, supra note 226, at 97–278; ROBERT E. HUMPHREY, CHILDREN OF FANTASY: THE
FIRST REBELS OF GREENWICH VILLAGE 158, 166 (1978).
233. John Mitchell, Automatic Compensation–The Injured Workman’s Right, 17 AM.
FEDERATIONIST 971, 975 (1910).
234. Weinstein, supra note 207, at 162–65; Asher, supra note 207, at 190–220; COMMONS, supra
note 178, at 570–72.
235. See infra notes 237–41 and accompanying text.
236. See JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A HISTORY OF
WISCONSIN’S LEGAL SYSTEM 366–68, 374–77 (1999); State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 109–10, 114
N.W. 137, 141 (1907); Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 201, 116 N.W. 885, 887 (1908).
237. 2 ROUJET D. MARSHALL, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROUJET D. MARSHALL 53–63 (Gilson
G. Glasier ed., 1931); see Houg v. Girard Lumber Co., 144 Wis. 337, 352–53 129 N.W. 633, 639
(1911) and Monaghan v. Nw. Fuel Co., 140 Wis. 457, 466–67, 122 N.W. 1066, 1070 (1909) (Marshall,
J., dissenting in part).
238. Houg, 144 Wis. at 352–53 (Marshall J., concurring).
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not scattering by the way human wrecks to float as derelicts for
a time, increasing the first cost till the accumulation disappears
from view in the world of consumable things? . . . Only the
law-making power can answer. At its door lies the duty to do
so, and will lie any sin there may be in not laboring to that
end.239
It was well established in common law that legislatures had nearly
unlimited power to modify tort rules of recovery; thus, Marshall did not see
workers compensation as revolutionary.240 In 1908, he quietly contacted
acquaintances in the Wisconsin legislature to offer help in drafting a workers
compensation law, and he subsequently played a behind-the-scenes role in the
drafting process.241 Other judges would second Marshall’s dissatisfaction with
the existing system, if not his activism, when they were asked to strike down
their states’ newly-enacted workers compensation laws.242
C. Workers Compensation Breaks Through
In 1909, the New York, Wisconsin, and Minnesota legislatures created
committees to study the workers compensation models reformers had advanced
and to propose laws for enactment.243 Fifteen other states followed suit in 1910
and 1911.244 New York was the first to complete the study-and-enactment
process. Its committee, headed by state senator Jonathan Wainwright with
Eastman serving as secretary, conducted hearings throughout the state; it also
examined European compensation systems and the history of employer liability
in America, and compiled detailed industrial-accident statistics for New
York.245 The Wainwright committee’s report echoed Wright more than
239. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Driscoll v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 144 Wis. 451, 468–
69, 129 N.W. 401, 408 (1911) (similar comments by Chief Justice John Winslow).
240. See MARSHALL, supra note 237, at 53–54.
241. Robert Asher, The 1911 Wisconsin Workmen’s Compensation Law: A Study in
Conservative Labor Reform, 57 WIS. MAG. HIST. 123, 126–29 (Winter 1973–74); MARSHALL, supra
note 237, at 53–59, 239–46.
242. See infra notes 271–85 and accompanying text.
243. 1909 N.Y. Laws 1310; 1909 Wis. Sess. Laws 664; Shawn Everett Kantor & Price V.
Fishback, How Minnesota Adopted Workers’ Compensation, 2 INDEP. REV. 557, 563 (1998).
244. In 1910 and 1911, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, Ohio, Michigan,
Iowa, Missouri, Texas, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington created similar commissions. U.S. DEP’T
OF LAB., BULLETIN NO. 203: WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 14–31 (1917). See generally Robert Asher, The Origins of Workmen’s
Compensation in Minnesota, 44 MINN. HIST. 142, 146 (Winter 1974); Kantor & Fishback, supra note
243, at 559.
245. COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909 TO INQUIRE INTO
THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK: FIRST REPORT 1–55 (1910) [hereinafter “Wainwright Commission”].

RANNEY_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

436

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:397

Eastman: it focused on the existing tort system’s economic inefficiency and its
tendency to promote labor unrest, with little direct discussion of the need to
alleviate injured workers’ suffering.246
The committee concluded that reform should be introduced gradually, and
it made two proposals. The first was a workers compensation system limited
to hazardous occupations such as railroad, construction, and electrical work;
workers would be allowed to opt out of the system and rely on existing
remedies, but employers would not.247 Injured workers would be paid
according to a statutory schedule based on the severity of their injuries.248 The
committee also proposed a separate system that employers and workers could
mutually agree to join. The voluntary system would make employers liable for
all machinery- and premises-related hazards, but it was not a no-fault system:
it preserved the fellow-servant rule in reduced form.249 After brief debate, the
legislature enacted both proposals with little change in June 1910.250
A legislative rush followed: between March and July 1911, nine other states
across the country enacted workers compensation laws.251 Like New York,
other early-adopting states wrestled with many questions of detail, most
importantly, whether the new systems should apply to all businesses or only to
limited industrial categories and whether the systems should be compulsory or
voluntary. Nearly all early-adopting states viewed their new laws as
experiments and chose to limit them to hazardous occupations. Some laws’
lists of hazardous occupations were short, but some were so extensive as to
encompass nearly all industrial work.252 Most states exempted farm workers
and domestic servants from the laws, categories which accounted in 1910 for
more than forty-percent of the American workforce, a few states also exempted
small businesses.253
Whether the new systems should be compulsory or voluntary was a more
difficult issue. Many legislators shared the concern of Illinois’ 1905 committee

246. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION, supra note 245, at 1–55.
247. Id. at 50.
248. Id. at 50–56.
249. Id. at 57–66.
250. 1910 N.Y. Laws 625, 1945.
251. 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 382–83; 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws 345; 1911 Nev. Stat. 362; 1911 Cal.
Stat. 796; 1911 N.H. Laws 181; 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 43; 1911 Ill. Laws 315; 1911 Ohio Laws 524;
1911 Mass. Acts 998.
252. See, e.g., 1911 Cal. Stat. 797; 1911 Nev. Stat. 362; 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 384–85; 1911 Ill.
Laws 316; 1911 Ohio Laws 528; 1911 Wash. Laws 346.
253. See, e.g., 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 385 (agricultural workers and companies with five or fewer
employees); 1911 Ohio Laws 528; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1910: ABSTRACT OF THE CENSUS 285, 437 (1913).
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that in an age where American courts were suspicious of reforms that imposed
limits on employers’ freedom and were protective of traditional concepts of
fault, compulsory systems imposing liability on employers without fault would
be held unconstitutional.254 They addressed that concern by creating voluntary
systems that allowed both employers and employees to opt out and rely on
common-law remedies. Among the early-adopting states, only New York,
Nevada, and Washington, whose legislature stressed the economic and
equitable need to “withdraw[] [industrial disputes] from private controversy,”
enacted compulsory systems.255
The voluntary states gave employers powerful carrot-and-stick incentives
to join their new systems. Nearly all workers compensation laws established
fixed rates of payment for temporary and permanent work-related injuries and
for deaths and set absolute limits on total recovery.256 In an age of everimproving risk statistics and risk-assessment techniques, the fixed rates and
caps enabled employers to calculate and predict their accident-related costs
with some certainty, and that was worth a great deal.257 The stick was that
employers who refused to join would be deprived of their common law defenses
of assumption of risk and fellow-servant liability, which would give juries freer
rein to render verdicts in injured workers’ favor and would reduce judges’
power to overturn those verdicts.258 Conversely, workers whose companies
elected to join the system had an incentive to do likewise: if they did not, the
company could invoke contributory negligence and other existing defenses
against them.259 Several voluntary states also encouraged participation by
providing that employers and workers would be deemed to have chosen to
participate in the new system unless they specifically notified the state
otherwise.260
V. RUNNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL GAUNTLET
A. The Ives Crisis
The workers compensation movement received a temporary setback in late
March 1911 when New York’s highest court struck down its state’s workers
254. See Rhodes, supra note 200, at 46–47; see WITT, supra note 95, at 137; 1907–1908 WBLIS
REPORT, supra note 191, at 117–20; see Henderson, supra note 216, at 79.
255. See 1911 Wash. Laws 345; 1911 Nev. Stat. 362.
256. See, e.g., 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 387–88; 1911 Ill. Laws 317; 1911 Wash. Laws 356.
257. See Asher, supra note 241, at 132–35.
258. See id. at 126–27.
259. Id. at 136–37; see, e.g., 1911 Ohio Laws 529; 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 43–44.
260. See, e.g., 1911 Ill. Laws 315; 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 44 (imposing notice requirement on
workers but not employers).
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compensation law in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.261 Ives brought the
constitutional worries of workers compensation supporters to a boil, even
though a careful reading of the decision revealed that it did not pose as grave a
threat as feared. Speaking for the court, Justice William Werner rejected an
attack on the New York law’s abolition of traditional tort defenses, adhering to
the principle that the legislature had nearly unlimited power to modify tort
rules.262 Werner also rejected an argument that applying a uniform rule to all
covered employers regardless of the degree of worker hazard in their businesses
violated constitutional equal protection guarantees,263 and he also declined to
consider a challenge based on the law’s failure to provide for trial by jury.264
But Werner drew the line at the law’s compulsory elimination of fault.
Imposing liability on an employer “who has omitted no legal duty and has
committed no wrong . . . based solely upon a legislative fiat that his business is
inherently dangerous,” he said, “. . . is taking the property of A. and giving it to
B., and that cannot be done under our Constitutions.”265 Werner conceded that
the law was supported by “cogent economic and sociological arguments” and
appealed to “a recognized and widely prevalent sentiment,”266 and he hinted
that amendment of New York’s constitution and revision of the statute might
resolve the flaws the court had found.267
The Ives decision created an uproar which grew louder when, the day after
the decision was issued, a fire broke out at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in
Manhattan. The factory’s fire escape doors were illegally locked, and as a result
146 trapped garment workers died, either of asphyxiation or of injuries from
leaping out of windows.268 Legislatures on the verge of enacting their own
workers compensation laws pressed on with the enactment process.
Massachusetts lawmakers asked their supreme court to give an advisory
opinion whether their proposed elective law would pass constitutional

261. Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
262. Id. at 437–38.
263. Id. at 438.
264. Id. at 438–39.
265. Id. at 440.
266. Id. at 439–40.
267. Id.
268. See WITT, supra note 95, at 175–77; Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory
Fire of 1911: Social Change, Industrial Accidents, and the Evolution of Common-Sense Causality, 20
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 621, 621–22 (1995).
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muster,269 and lawsuits were soon filed in Washington and Wisconsin to test
the validity of those states’ new laws.270
In May 1911, the Massachusetts court advised its legislature that the state’s
proposed elective law would be constitutional,271 and in September,
Washington’s supreme court upheld its state’s compulsory law.272 In a terse
opinion, Massachusetts’s justices pointed to the legislature’s broad power to
modify tort rules and found that the proposed law’s exemption of farm workers
and servants from its scope was reasonable.273 They also stressed that the law’s
voluntary feature eliminated any concern about deprivation of liberty or
property rights or lack of a jury trial.274 That saving feature was not available
to Washington’s justices, but they did not need it. In State ex rel. Davis-Smith
Co. v. Clausen (1911), the court, speaking through Justice Mark Fullerton,
rejected Werner’s argument that legislatures could not impose liability without
fault.275 Fullerton pointed out that in the past many railroad fencing statutes
upheld by American courts had done just that. Washington’s new law, even
though compulsory, was well within the scope of the state’s police power to
promote public safety and welfare.276 That fact, he said, justified any collateral
limitation the law imposed on employers’ and workers’ freedom to contract as
they saw fit, and it justified the legislature’s decision not to provide for trial of
compensation disputes by jury.277
Fullerton carefully refrained from
denouncing Ives but said openly that “we have not been able to yield our
consent to the view there taken.” 278
In November, Wisconsin’s supreme court followed suit in Borgnis v. Falk
Co. (1911).279 Like their Massachusetts and Washington counterparts,
Wisconsin’s justices adhered to a broad view of legislative power to modify
common law tort defenses and rejected an equal protection challenge to the
state’s new law.280 They agreed with the Massachusetts court that because the
new law was elective, it did not violate employers’ or workers’ property and
269. See In re Op. of Justices, 96 N.E. 308 (Mass. 1911).
270. State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 117 P. 1101 (Wash. 1911); Borgnis v. Falk Co.,
147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (Wis. 1911).
271. In re Op. of Justices, 96 N.E. at 315–16.
272. Clausen, 117 P. at 1113–14.
273. In re Op. of Justices, 96 N.E. at 315–16.
274. Id. at 316.
275. Clausen,117 P. at 1106–10.
276. Id. at 1111–13.
277. Id. at 1118–19.
278. In re Op. of Justices, 96 N.E. at 309; Clausen, 117 P. at 1120.
279. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (Wis. 1911).
280. Id. at 357–58.
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liberty rights or deprive them of any right to a jury trial.281 Borgnis illuminated
both the common ground that Progressive sympathizers and conservatives had
found as to workers compensation and the differences in their perspectives.
Winslow viewed himself as a “constructive conservative”: he believed that
constitutions must be interpreted flexibly in light of modern conditions,282 a
philosophy which he distilled in a famous passage in Borgnis. To say that a
constitution’s “general provisions [must] be construed and interpreted by an
eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century conditions and
ideals,” said Winslow, was “to command the race to halt in its progress, to
stretch the state upon a veritable bed of Procrustes.”283 Marshall agreed that the
new law was well within the scope of the legislature’s established authority to
modify tort law,284 but as a committed constitutional originalist, he viewed
Winslow’s discourse on constitutional flexibility as misguided and dangerous.
“If the constitution is to efficiently endure,” he argued, “the idea that it is
capable of being re-squared, from time to time, to fit new legislative or judicial
notions of necessities . . . must be combated whenever and wherever
advanced.”285
B. Workers Compensation Settles In
Emboldened by these decisions, eleven additional states adopted workers
compensation laws in 1912 and 1913,286 and by 1920 such laws were in place
throughout all regions of the United States except the deep South.287 The
Washington supreme court’s decision also encouraged several states to switch
from elective to compulsory systems.288 Events in New York following Ives
underscored the strength of the tide. Legal commentators criticized Werner’s
statement that there could be no liability without fault, pointing out, as had
Justice Fullerton, that absolute liability had long played a role in both the

281. Id. at 357.
282. See, e.g., JOHN BRADLEY WINSLOW, THE PATRIOT AND THE COURTS 7–9 (1909)
[hereinafter WINSLOW PAPERS]; John B. Winslow, An Understanding Heart: Does the American
Judge Possess It?, 31 SURVEY 17 (1914).
283. Borgins, 147 Wis. at 349. Winslow took the Procrustes metaphor from the Greek myth of
a giant who racked too-short victims and mutilated too-tall victims in order to fit all to his iron bed.
284. Id. at 380 (Marshall, J., concurring).
285. Id. at 375 (Marshall, J., concurring).
286. LINDLEY D. CLARK & MARTIN C. FRINCKE, JR., WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
LEGISLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 9 (1921).
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., 1911 Cal Stat. 796; 1913 Cal. Stat. 279.
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common law and statutory law.289 Theodore Roosevelt made Ives a centerpiece
of his argument for recall of unpopular court decisions during his unsuccessful
1912 campaign to regain the presidency,290 and in order to put all doubt to rest,
the AALL launched a campaign to amend state constitutions to authorize
workers compensation.291 The AALL’s campaign bore fruit in five states
including New York, whose voters ratified a workers-compensation
amendment in 1913 and subsequently rejected Werner’s bid to become chief
justice.292 In 1915 New York’s legislature enacted a new elective system,
which the state’s highest court subsequently upheld.293
The Spread of Workers Compensation, 1909–19 294
(Map generated from a template provided by courtesy of mapchart.net)

289. See Andrew A. Bruce, The New York Employers’ Liability Act, 9 MICH. L. REV. 684, 694–
95 (1910); James Parker Hall, The New York Workmen’s Compensation Act Decision, 19 J. POL. ECON.
694, 697 (1911); EDITH M. PHELPS, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE RECALL INCLUDING THE RECALL
OF JUDGES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 248–50 (2d ed. 1915).
290. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 57–58 (2009); see, also, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt,
Address at the Ohio Constitutional Convention: A Charter of Democracy, (Feb. 21, 1912); Theodore
Roosevelt, President, Address at Carnegie Hall: The Right of the People to Rule, (Mar. 20, 1912).
291. WITT, supra note 95, at 180–81.
292. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 19 (amended 1913); WITT, supra note 95, at 180–81.
293. 1915 N.Y. Laws 554–55, 2259; Jensen v. S. Pac. R. Co., 109 N.E. 600, 604 (N.Y. 1917).
294. The figure is compiled from CLARK & FRINCKE, supra note 286, at 9.
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The workers compensation tide did not completely exorcise the specter of
constitutional challenge, particularly for compulsory laws. In 1909, Montana
had enacted a limited compensation system that required mining companies and
their workers to contribute to a state insurance fund that paid fixed sums for
injury and death,295 but at the end of 1911 its supreme court struck down the
law on the ground that unlike other compensation laws, it did not grant
employers exemption from common law liability or any other benefit in return
for their forced contributions.296 In 1914, Kentucky’s supreme court struck
down its state’s elective law by a 4-3 vote based on a state constitutional
provision that prohibited enactment of any limits on damages for personal
injury or property damage.297 The court also criticized the legislature’s decision
to require employers and workers to give notice if they wished to opt out of the
statute, concluding that this effectively made the law compulsory and deprived
all parties of their freedom of contract.298
In 1915, California’s supreme court upheld both its state’s 1911 elective
law and a superseding 1913 compulsory law,299 but Justice Lucien Shaw, a
well-respected jurist whose reputation extended beyond his state, raised two
disturbing and potentially important points of doubt in his concurring opinion.
Shaw argued that California’s compulsory law was saved only by the fact that,
like Washington’s law, it required employers to pay premiums into a common,
state-administered fund as a sort of tax.300 He reasoned that if the law had
required employers to procure insurance or assume liability individually (as
was the case in some other states), that would impermissibly have allowed
imposition of liability without fault and, thus, would have created an
unconstitutional taking of property.301 Shaw also believed that the legislature
could not constitutionally provide benefits to workers who were entirely
responsible for their own injury without any fault of others.302 Such workers

295. 1909 Mont. Laws 81.
296. Cunningham v. Nw. Improvement Co., 119 P. 554, 566 (Mont. 1911).
297. Ky. State. J. Co. v Workmen’s Comp. Bd., 170 S.W. 1166, 1169–1171 (Ky. 1914). Two
years later, Pennsylvania’s supreme court peremptorily rejected a challenge to that state’s elective law
based on a state constitutional provision similar to Kentucky’s. Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 99 A.
215, 217 (Pa. 1916); PA. CONST. art. III, § 21 (1874).
298. Ky. State. J. Co., 170 S.W. at 116869; 1914 Ky. Acts 226; Ky. CONST. § 54 (1891).
299. W. Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 151 P. 398, 406 (Cal. 1915); 1911 Cal. Stat. 796; 1913 Cal.
Stat. 279.
300. Pillsbury, 151 P. at 406–07 (Shaw, J., concurring).
301. Id.
302. Id.
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could perhaps be compensated through general public welfare programs but not
by forcing employers to pay.303
Despite these setbacks and doubts, after Ives every new workers
compensation law, whether elective304 or compulsory,305 survived
constitutional challenge except for Montana’s 1909 law and Kentucky’s 1914
law; and both of those states promptly enacted new laws that their supreme
courts upheld.306 Arguments used by opponents in the early Massachusetts,
Washington, and Wisconsin cases–legislative lack of power to alter tort law and
abolish traditional employer defenses, violation of due process by departing
from a fault-based system, and deprivation of the right to trial by jury–were
regularly raised but uniformly rejected.307 Equal protection challenges also
continued to arise in a variety of forms. Some states excluded small companies
from their workers compensation laws, partly because they believed workers in
small companies were in closer contact with their employer’s operations and,
thus, had more opportunity to guard against hazards, and partly because small
employers complained loudly that they had limited resources and could not
easily pass on insurance costs to consumers. State supreme courts uniformly
rejected equal protection challenges to such classifications;308 they also rejected
303. Id.
304. Decisions upholding elective laws include State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602,
607–08 (Ohio 1912); Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 86 A. 451, 452 (N.J. 1913); Deibeikis v, LinkBelt Co., 104 N.E. 211, 212 (Ill. 1914); Shade v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 139 P.
1193, 1193 (Kan. 1914); Matheson v. Minneapolis State Ry. Co., 148 N.W. 71, 73 (Minn. 1914);
Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 154 N.W. 1037, 1041 (Iowa 1915); Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle
Co., 153 N.W. 49, 51 (Mich. 1915); Wheeler v. Contoocook Mills Corp., 94 A. 265 (N.H. 1915);
Evanhoff v. State Indus. Acct. Comm., 154 P. 106, 111 (Or. 1915); Jensen v. S. Pac. R. Co., 109 N.E.
600, 604 (N.Y. 1917); Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 99 A. 215, 217 (Pa. 1916); Sayles v. Foley, 96
A. 340, 342 (R.I. 1916); De Francesco v. Piney Mining Co., 86 S.E. 777, 778 (W.Va. 1915); and
Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 185 S.W. 556, 558 (Tex. 1916). See generally CLARK &
FRINCKE supra note 286, at 69–90.
305. Decisions upholding compulsory laws include Pillsbury, 151 P. 198 at 406; Solvuca v. Ryan
& Reilly Co., 101 A. 710, 714–16 (Md. 1917); Anderson v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 24 Haw. 97, 115
(1917); and Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Mendez, 166 P. 278, 285 (Ariz. 1917).
306. 1915 Mont. Laws 168; 1916 Ky. Acts 354; Greene v. Caldwell, 186 S.W. 648, 649 (Ky.
1916); Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co., 179 P. 499, 502 (Mont. 1919).
307. Examples include the following. Rejecting argument of no power to change tort law:
Deibeikis, 104 N.E. at 215; Matheson, 148 N.W. at 73; Contoocook Mills, 94 A. at 265; Middleton,
185 S.W. at 559. Rejecting argument of deprivation of right to jury trial: In re Op. of Justices, 96 N.E.
308, 316 (Mass. 1911); Creamer, 97 N.E. at 607; Sexton, 86 A. at 457; Hunter, 154 N.W. at 1066;
Shea, 179 P. at 499; Sayles, 96 A. at 346–47. Rejecting argument that absence of fault component
violated due process and freedom of contract: see the cases previously cited in this note. See generally
CLARK & FRINCKE, supra note 286, at 72–79, 95–99.
308. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 357, 133 N.W. 209, 217–18 (Wis. 1911); see also, e.g.,
Sexton, 86 A. at 458; Matheson, 148 N.W. at 74; and Mackin, 153 N.W. at 55.
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challenges to laws that limited workers compensation to listed occupations
deemed to be hazardous, deferring to legislators’ choices of classification.309 In
some states, opponents argued that laws requiring employers and workers who
wished to opt out to give written notice amounted to coercion and violated their
rights to due process of law, but most courts other than Kentucky’s disagreed.310
Several of the unsuccessful state-court challenges made their way to the
U.S. Supreme Court, and in 1917 the Court issued three decisions involving
New York’s new workers compensation law and Washington’s and Iowa’s
laws.311 The decisions ended virtually all doubt as to the constitutionality of
both elective and compulsory workers compensation.312 In an era when the
high Court scrutinized reform laws closely and often skeptically,313 the absence
of skepticism in its workers compensation decisions was striking. Justice
Mahlon Pitney firmly endorsed the view that employers’ traditional tort
defenses–which, in his view, were “of comparatively recent origin” and not
worthy even of designation as traditional314–could be freely altered by the
legislature.315 The image of workers as soldiers in the battle for industrial
production, deserving of care if they fell, resonated with Pitney and his
colleagues;316 they also accepted the view that accidents should be viewed in
terms of inevitability and risk rather than individual fault.317
The high Court had no difficulty rejecting other arguments against workers
compensation laws. Such laws did not violate employers’ and workers’
property rights, said Pitney: they were designed to address a genuine social
309. See, e.g., Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 248 F. 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1918) (Alaska law
limited to miners); Middleton, 185 S.W. at 558, aff’d, 249 U.S. 152 (1919) (law excluded cotton-gin
workers).
310. See, e.g., Mackin 153 N.W. at 51; compare with Ky. State. J. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Bd.,
170 S.W. 1166 (Ky. 1914) (criticizing notice requirements).
311. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916) (upholding New York’s elective second
law); Mt. Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (upholding Washington’s compulsory law);
Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (upholding Iowa’s elective law).
312. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. 188; Mt. Timber Co., 243 U.S. 219; Hawkins, 243 U.S. 210.
In 1915, the Court had sent an early signal of encouragement to supporters, holding that Ohio’s
exclusion of small employers from its workers compensation system was a reasonable classification.
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571 (1915).
313. See infra notes 333–36 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., 8 Owen M. Fiss, TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, in THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 178 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993);
EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 97–128 (1996).
314. White, 243 U.S. at 198; Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 239–40.
315. White, 243 U.S. at 200; Hawkins, 243 U.S. at 213; Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 236.
316. See White, 243 U.S. at 202–03; Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 239–40.
317. White, 243 U.S. at 203; Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 239–40.
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problem, and although each side was compelled to forego former advantages,
each received new benefits in return.318 Echoing Lucien Shaw’s critique, Pitney
indicated that a constitutional boundary line still existed: no system could set
aside old rules “without providing a reasonably just substitute,” but he also
indicated that the Court would take an indulgent view of what that included.319
The Court held that there was little difference for constitutional purposes
between elective and compulsory systems: given workers compensation’s
compelling public purpose, even compulsory systems would pass muster if
charges to employers were reasonable in amount and “fairly distributed.”320
Pitney also rejected equal protection challenges to the laws, again indicating
that the Court would be highly deferential to state legislatures’ classification
decisions,321 and he firmly rejected challenges based on the lack of trial by jury:
initial determination of compensation awards by administrative tribunals was
appropriate, and nearly all laws allowed court review of tribunal decisions.322
In 1919, the high Court finished mapping the basic constitutional
parameters of workers compensation when it addressed unusual features of the
Texas and Arizona systems.323 Texas’s law allowed employers to elect before
their workers whether they would join the system, but it made the system
compulsory for all workers whose employers so elected.324 Pitney upheld this
apparent discrimination, reasoning that employers and workers made different
types of investments in the industrial system; that both sides benefited from the
security the system provided; and that uniformity among workers, even
compelled uniformity, would promote harmony.325 Arizona tested the limits of
the Court’s tolerance: the state’s constitution mandated a system that was
compulsory for hazardous industries but allowed workers to elect their remedy
at any time before or after an injury, thus, depriving employers of a large part
of the predictability that had made workers compensation attractive to them.326
Some states had recognized the problem and had required workers to elect
before they were injured,327 but in Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer (1919), the

318. White, 243 U.S. at 203; Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 240–41.
319. White, 243 U.S. at 201.
320. Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 238.
321. White, 243 U.S. at 208; Hawkins, 243 U.S. at 217–18; Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 23–40.
322. White, 243 U.S. at 208; Hawkins, 243 U.S. at 216–17; Mt. Timber, 243 U.S. at 235.
323. Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919); Ariz. Employers’ Liability
Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 403 (1919).
324. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 429.
325. Middleton, 249 U.S. at 161–62.
326. ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 8 (1912); 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws 23.
327. See, e.g., 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 45–46; Asher, supra note 241, at 136–37.
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Court narrowly upheld Arizona’s law.328 Four dissenters argued that the law
violated employers’ due process and equal protection rights: “[W]hile the
employer is declared subject to new, uncertain and greatly enlarged liability”
notwithstanding use of the utmost care, Justice James McReynolds complained,
“nothing has been granted him in return.”329 Arizona Copper was a reminder
that the Court would not grant legislatures unlimited leeway in replacing faultbased tort systems, but it also confirmed the Court’s strong blessing on the
workers compensation movement.
C. Progressives’ Influence on Judicial Attitudes
Judicial receptivity to workers compensation laws was influenced by an
ongoing clash between Progressives and conservatives over the proper balance
of power between reform-minded legislators, judges, and juries. Latenineteenth-century jurists accepted as a truism that juries were unduly
sympathetic to accident victims and, in the words of one state supreme court
judge, were “apt to find . . . corporations liable for losses and injuries under
circumstances where an individual would not be held responsible.”330 Future
North Dakota Justice Andrew Bruce, writing in 1902, noted public awareness
that “the tendency is steadily growing toward a stricter control of the jury by
the courts,”331 and he worried that this would soon produce a crisis:
An injured man can rarely be brought to see the justice of a
verdict which is returned against him by a jury. Much less can
he be induced to acquiesce when a Supreme Court judge,
whom he has not seen and who knows only of the case as it is
presented to him on the printed record, is responsible for his
overthrow. As things now are, it is perhaps not an exaggeration
to say that every personal injury case is a factor in the increase
of social discontent.332
Furthermore, beginning in the 1890s federal and state judges, many of
whom believed devoutly in free-labor principles and conceived property and
liberty rights and freedom of contract in broad terms, closely scrutinized
Progressive-endorsed reform laws addressing political corruption, taxation,

328. Ariz. Employers’ Liability Cases, 250 U.S. at 421–23.
329. Id. at 450 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
330. Pike v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 40 Wis. 583, 586 (1876); see also James R.
Burnet, Critical Opinions Upon Recent Employers’ Liability Legislation in the United States, 50 J.
SOC. SCI. 53–54 (1902) (expressing a similar opinion in stronger language).
331. Andrew Bruce, Employers’ Liability in the United States, 33 FORUM 46, 48 (1902).
332. Id. at 49.
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workplace safety, utility regulation, and other pressing social issues.333 They
upheld most reform laws, as the workers compensation experience illustrated,
but they struck down enough laws to elicit Progressive ire.334 Lochner v. New
York, a 1904 U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down a law limiting
bakers’ hours of work despite evidence that their overlong hours affected public
health, became the Progressives’ leading specimen of judicial overreach,335 but
there were many others.336
Progressives who felt that judges went too far in overriding juries and
scrutinizing reform laws eventually launched a movement to curb judicial
power through popular recall of judges and of court decisions. In 1908, Oregon
became the first state to provide for recall of judges; several other states
followed suit, and the movement reached a climax in 1912.337 During that year,
Ohio voters ratified a new constitution explicitly authorizing judicial recall as
well as several other Progressive reform measures that had previously been
struck down by the state’s supreme court,338 and Theodore Roosevelt made
recall of unpopular decisions a key theme of his campaign to regain the
presidency as the Progressive Party’s candidate.339 Roosevelt privately hoped
that judges would make recall measures unnecessary by engaging in selfcorrection, but he warned that judicial overreaching was “turning large classes

333. FISS, supra note 313, at 178; KEYNES, supra note 313, at 97–115; Michael Les Benedict,
Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293, 328–30 (1985).
334. Id.
335. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905); see also, e.g., GILBERT E. ROE, OUR
JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY 34–40 (1912), FISS, supra note 313, at 170–75.
336. Other decisions cited by Progressives as examples of judicial overreach included, e.g.,
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (striking down law banning “yellow dog” contracts,
which required workers as a condition of employment to agree not to join a union) and Employers’
Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908) (striking down federal law liberalizing injured railroad
workers’ recovery rights). See ROE, supra note 335, at 40–43, 117–20, 129–31, 142–45; WILLIAM L.
RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE JUDICIARY 16–17 (1912); EDITH M. PHELPS, SELECTED
ARTICLES ON THE RECALL: INCLUDING THE RECALL OF JUDGES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 82–94
(1915).
337. OR. CONST. art. II, § 18 (1908). Other states that enacted judicial recall measures included
California, Arizona, Colorado, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15 (1911); ARIZ.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1912); COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 (1912); N.D. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 10 (1920);
WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 12 (1926). See also THOMAS GOEBEL, A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE:
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1890–1946 65–68 (2002).
338. CLARENCE E. WALKER, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 384–86 (Roosevelt), 669 (comments by William Jennings Bryan
to convention regarding judges) (1912); OHIO CONST. II:38 (1912) (recall provision).
339. See In re Op. of Justices, 96 N.E. 308 (Mass. 1911); State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v.
Clausen, 117 P. 1101 (Wash. 1911); see also Roe, supra note 335, at 207–19.
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of people against the life, liberty and property clauses” and toward socialism.340
A few judges, most notably North Carolina Chief Justice Walter Clark,
sympathized with the Progressives. Between 1906 and 1915, Clark argued in
a series of speeches and articles that use of judicial power to strike down reform
laws was directly responsible for Progressives’ ire and for the recall
movement.341 He singled out Lochner for particular criticism, charging that it
“was in truth based upon unwillingness to curb the power of the employer over
the employee,” and he intimated that recall was an appropriate solution: all
branches of government, he said, “are subject to only one reviewing body and
that is the Sovereign–the people themselves.”342
But Progressives were far from united on judicial recall. The idealized
image of judges as detached appliers of rules divorced from politics, an image
that was particularly powerful among the legal community and the public
during the late nineteenth century,343 meshed with the broad Progressive vision
of a government administered by experts based on scientific principles,344 and
Wisconsin Chief Justice John Winslow took great care to promote the idealized
judicial image.345 In 1909, he embarked on a campaign of speeches and articles
designed to explain conservatives and Progressives to each other and to
promote his vision of constructive conservatism. Winslow urged conservatives
to bear in mind that “as individual life has more and more given place to
crowded community life, the rights and privileges once deemed essential to the
perfect liberty of the individual are often found . . . to breed wrong and injustice
to the community at large,” language that he would echo in the Borgnis case.346

340. MILKIS, supra note 290, at 91 (quoting Roosevelt campaign address at Omaha, Nebraska,
Apr. 27, 1912).
341. Walter Clark, Some Defects in the Constitution of the United States, 54 AM. L. REG. 263,
277–82 (1906); Walter Clark, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, address delivered
at Cooper Union, New York City, Government by Judges (Jan. 27, 1914); Walter Clark, Letter, 19
LAW NOTES 178, 178–79 (Dec. 1915); Walter Clark, Back to the Constitution, 50 AM. L. REV. 1, 13
(1916).
342. Letter, supra note 341, at 179 (quotation re: sovereignty); Clark, Back to the Constitution,
supra note 341, at 8 (Lochner criticism).
343. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251, 254–55,
257–62, 264 (1975).
344. See MCCARTHY, supra note 198, at 169; CROLY, supra note 198, at 397–400.
345. See infra note 347 and authorities there cited.
346. WINSLOW PAPERS, supra note 282, at 9; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 348, 133 N.W.
209, 215–16 (Wis. 1911). For other examples of Winslow’s campaign, see WINSLOW, Understanding
Heart supra note 282; see also John B. Winslow, The Judicial Recall: Is it a Remedy or a Nostrum?,
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Session of the Kansas Conference of Charities and Correction
106 (1912); and WINSLOW PAPERS, supra note 282, at 26–27 (Winslow, Some Tendencies of Modern
Legislation and Judicial Decisions (lecture notes, May 3, 1916)).
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But he also reminded Progressive critics that “[j]udges are sworn to protect and
support . . . constitutions as they are, and not as they would like to see them.”347
Others in the legal community mounted a vigorous campaign against
judicial recall, decrying it as an assault on the foundations of American
democracy,348 but judges took note of the criticisms, and as the Progressive era
advanced, several state courts that had shown a high propensity to strike down
reform laws began to take a substantially more deferential view of new reforms
coming before them for review.349 That response also manifested itself in the
readiness with which courts agreed that workers compensation laws were
constitutional. Temperamentally conservative judges such as Marshall
overcame any scruples about the new laws by reasoning that workers
compensation was a special case, essentially a program for the greater public
good whose cost was ultimately borne by the public at large, and that employers
lost some benefits but received others in return.350 But other judges, like
Winslow and Pitney, took note of public criticism of later-nineteenth-century
judges’ perspectives on constitutionality and more openly accepted the idea that
new perspectives were called for.351

347. WINSLOW PAPERS, supra note 282, at 9.
348. Nicholas Murray Butler, Why Should We Change Our Form of Government?, 62d Cong.,
1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 238, reprinted in PHELPS, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE RECALL, 50–53
(1915); Rome G. Brown, The Judicial Recall: A Fallacy Repugnant to Constitutional Government, 43
ANNALS AM. ACAD. 239 (1912); William B. Hornblower, Independence of the Judiciary the Safeguard
of Free Institutions, 22 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1912); see also PHELPS, supra note 336, at passim.
349. Leading examples include: New York, compare, e.g., People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 59
N.E. 716, 723 (N.Y. 1901) (striking down law pegging wages on public-works projects to prevailing
wages) and People v. Williams, 81 N.E. 778, 779 (N.Y. 1907) (striking down maximum-work-hours
law for women) with People ex rel. Williams Eng. & Contracting Co. v. Metz, 85 N.E. 1070, 1071
(N.Y. 1908) (upholding new public works wage law following enactment of amendment to New York
constitution allowing such laws) and People ex rel. Hoelderlin v. Kane, 139 N.Y.S. 350, 357 (S.Ct.
1913), aff’d, People v. Hoelderlin, 146 N.Y.S. 1105 (App. Div. 1914) (upholding maximum-workhours law). Ohio: Compare, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 65 N.E. 885, 886
(Ohio 1902) (striking down maximum-work-hours law for public works projects) with Stange v. City
of Cleveland, 114 N.E. 261, 262 (Ohio 1916) (upholding new public-works hours law). Illinois:
Compare, e.g., Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 455 (Ill. 1895) (striking down maximum-work-hours
law for women) with W. C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 91 N.E. 695, 696 (Ill. 1910) (upholding new
law). See generally RANNEY, supra note 131, at 135–38 and particularly the authorities cited at id.,
136–37, note 87–102.
350. See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 282–85, 341–47 and accompanying text.
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VI. THE SLOW RISE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. Key Progressive-Era Laws
After the Georgia and Illinois experiments of the 1850s, comparative
negligence made no further advance for fifty years except for Florida’s adoption
of the Georgia system in 1887,352 but a new breakthrough came shortly after
1900. Once again, the path to reform ran along rails. Between 1905 and 1907,
three states enacted degree-based negligence statutes allowing railroad workers
a recovery, albeit a reduced one, in cases where a worker’s negligence was
slight and the employer’s negligence was gross.353 In 1906, after four years of
deliberation, Congress enacted the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA)
which applied a similar degrees-of-negligence approach.354 Section 2 of the
law provided that a railroad worker’s negligence would not bar recovery “where
his contributory negligence was slight and that of the employer was gross in
comparison,”355 and that the worker’s damages award would be reduced “in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable” to him.356
Section 2’s origin, like that of the 1905–07 state statutes, was obscure. Each
of the statutes reflected a lingering reluctance to let go of contributory
negligence altogether, notwithstanding the criticism that the slight-ordinarygross negligence framework had encountered half a century earlier.357 Georgia
Senator Augustus Bacon claimed that Section 2 was derived from his state’s
comparative negligence law,358 but Georgia’s law did not mention a slightordinary-gross framework.359 Indiana Representative Edgar Crumpacker, a
leading critic of the bill, viewed the bill as “revolutionary”: he likely focused
on the bill’s proportional-recovery feature rather than the slight-gross
distinction.360 Others believed the bill was merely a federal version of existing
state laws.361
The FELA passed by a comfortable margin with bipartisan support, but in
early 1908 the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down on the narrow ground that it

352. See supra notes 7, 62, and accompanying text.
353. 1910 Ohio Laws 319; 1907 Neb. Laws, ch. 48; 1907 N. D. Laws 333.
354. Ch. 2073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906); see 59 CONG. REC. 1742, 1744 (1906).
355. Ch. 2073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906).
356. Id.
357. See supra notes 30–47 and accompanying text.
358. 59 CONG. REC. 1746–47 (1906).
359. CLARK, COBB & IRWIN, supra note 56, § 2979; see also 1855–1856 Ga. Laws, 155.
360. 59 CONG. REC. 4605–06 (1906).
361. Id. at 4607 (statement by Rep. Robert Lee Henry of Texas that the bill only “modifies and
mitigates” contributory negligence).
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was not limited to interstate commerce, as the federal Constitution required.362
The high Court did not rule on whether Section 2’s change in tort liability rules
violated due process, but it referred to earlier cases upholding state employer
liability laws, thus, giving supporters hope that an amended law would
withstand court scrutiny.363 In the meantime, Wisconsin’s 1907 legislature
enacted a law for railroad workers that contained the first truly modern
formulation of comparative negligence.364 The Wisconsin law stated that:
In all cases where the jury shall find that the negligence of the
company . . . was greater than the negligence of the employe
so injured, and contributing in a greater degree to such injury,
then the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover, and the
negligence, if any, of the employe so injured shall be no bar to
such recovery.365
This formulation jettisoned contributory negligence and degree systems in
favor of a simple balancing test, one that gave juries much more latitude than
did the old rules. That fact did not go unnoticed. Edward Hyzer, a railroad
lobbyist, argued during pre-enactment hearings that comparative negligence
would allow juries to render verdicts “according to caprice” and would risk a
“return to barbarism.”366 But the formulation preserved an important free-labor
element: accident victims could recover only if they were not primarily at fault.
If their fault equaled or exceeded the defendant’s, they must take full
responsibility for their loss, and they could not recover any damages.367
When FELA supporters introduced a new bill in Congress in 1908, they
modified the comparative negligence section (now § 3 of the bill)
substantially.368 Like Wisconsin’s 1907 law, the new bill dropped all reference
to degrees and provided that contributory negligence would no longer be a bar
to recovery; but unlike Wisconsin’s law, it adopted “pure” comparative
negligence, allowing partial recovery even where a plaintiff’s negligence
equaled or exceeded the defendant’s negligence.369 There was lively debate in
the House Judiciary Committee, which was assigned the task of evaluating the
362. Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 503 (1908).
363. Id. Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
364. 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 903; WIS. STATS. § 1816a (1911).
365. WIS. STATS. § 1816a(4) (1911).
366. EDWARD M. HYZER, ARGUMENT ON NEGLIGENCE BILLS PENDING BEFORE THE
LEGISLATURE OF 1907 10 (1907).
367. WIS. STATS. § 1816a(4) (1911). In 1913, the legislature amended the 1907 law to confirm
that plaintiffs’ damages would be reduced in proportion to their negligence. 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws
840.
368. H.R. 20810, 60th Cong. § 149 (1st Sess. 1908).
369. Id.
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bill. The committee rejected criticisms similar to Hyzer’s; it concluded that
comparative negligence was “nearer ideal justice” than contributory
negligence, a fact that outweighed any practical difficulties of comparison.370
Opponents also argued that the law should be confined to extra-hazardous
railroad jobs, but supporters replied impatiently that it was too late to raise the
issue: the law would apply to all railroad employees, from engineers to shipping
clerks.371 In the end, the new FELA passed with large majorities in both
houses.372
Both the Wisconsin law and the 1908 FELA elicited constitutional
challenges. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad (Milwaukee Road)
challenged the Wisconsin law after its employees Michael Kiley, a fence
builder whose eye had been put out by a flying staple, and John Zeratsky, a
brakeman injured in a train collision, secured judgments against it.373 The
railroad made an equal protection challenge in Kiley’s case, arguing that the
legislature had improperly extended the law to railway employees engaged in
nonhazardous jobs and had improperly ignored other hazardous businesses.374
The state supreme court disagreed, holding that unique nature of railroads and
their hazards justified singling them out for special legislation.375 In Zeratsky’s
case, the Milwaukee Road tried another line of attack. The 1907 law required
juries to determine whether each party’s negligence “directly contributed to the
injury,” and the railroad argued this violated the long-standing rule that
defendants could be held liable only if their negligence proximately caused
injury.376 The court again disagreed: it interpreted “direct contribution” as
meaning proximate cause.377 The Milwaukee Road also argued that juries must
be given standards for making comparisons and that there would be no standard
unless the old three-degree system was read into the law, an invitation that the
court summarily declined.378
Justice Marshall was the lone dissenter in the Kiley and Zeratsky cases, and
his dissents illustrated the limits of conservative judges’ tolerance for tort
370. CONG. REC., 60TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESS., 4435 (House of Representatives, Apr. 6, 1908)
(citation omitted), 4526–38 (Senate, Apr. 9, 1908).
371. Id. at 4428–30, 4435–36 (House of Representatives, Apr. 6, 1908), (Senate, Apr. 9, 1908).
372. Id. at 4438–39 (House of Representatives, Apr. 6, 1908), 4550 (Senate, Apr. 9, 1908).
373. Kiley v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 138 Wis. 215, 217, 119 N.W. 309, 311 (Wis.
1909); Zeratsky v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 141 Wis. 423, 424–25, 123 N.W. 904, 905–
06 (Wis. 1909).
374. Kiley, 138 Wis. at 219.
375. Id. at 223–24.
376. Zeratsky, 141 Wis. at 428.
377. Id. at 430.
378. Id. at 432–33.
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reform.379 Marshall was willing to decouple fault from liability if, as with
workers compensation, that was done by creating a system formally separated
from tort law and directed to a distinct social problem.380 But comparative
negligence was different: the 1907 law did not identify railroads as an
institution uniquely in need of comparative negligence, and in his view, the law
violated equal protection guarantees because it was not limited to hazardous
railroad jobs.381 The specter of uncontrolled jury discretion in negligence
apportionment was also very much on Marshall’s mind. In his view, the 1907
law allowed juries to hold railroads liable no matter how remote their
negligence or how proximate the plaintiffs to the accident.382 But Marshall
could not persuade his colleagues, and in Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Co. (1912), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected a
challenge to the 1908 FELA that was based on an equal protection argument
similar to that made in the Kiley case.383
In 1910, Mississippi became the first state to enact a comparative
negligence law for all personal injury cases.384 It adopted the “pure” formula
of the 1908 FELA rather than Wisconsin’s diluted formula, which denied
recovery to plaintiffs whose negligence equaled or exceeded the defendant’s
negligence.385 Opponents challenged the Mississippi law’s constitutionality,
arguing that apportionment of negligence was a judicial function that could not
be delegated to juries.386 Mississippi’s supreme court disagreed: in its view,
negligence apportionment was really a determination of fact, a function
traditionally given to juries, and judges retained their power to overturn
apportionments that were unsupported by evidence.387
B. A Post-Progressive-Era Stall
The FELA proved to be an important early catalyst for comparative
negligence: between 1908 and 1920, sixteen states adopted little-FELA laws

379. Kiley, 138 Wis. at 232–57 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zeratsky, 141 Wis. at 437–46
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
380. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
381. Kiley, 138 Wis. at 240–41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 253 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
383. H.R. 20810, 60th Cong. § 149 (1st Sess. 1908); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, and Hartford
R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55–56 (1912).
384. 1910 Miss. Laws 125.
385. Id.
386. Natchez & S. R.R. Co. v. Crawford, 55 So. 596, 598–99 (Miss. 1911).
387. Crawford, 55 So. At 598–99. Mississippi’s 1910 law may have been inspired in part by the
FELA. William H. McMullen, Torts–Effect of Mississippi’s Comparative Negligence Statute on Other
Rules of Law, 39 MISS. L.J. 493, 494–97 (1968).
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applying the FELA model to intrastate railroads,388 three states extended the
FELA model to certain other occupations,389 and, in 1920, Congress extended
the FELA to maritime workers.390 Two states also adopted Wisconsin’s diluted
comparative-negligence model for railroad workers.391 But comparative
negligence systems spread only slowly after 1920.392 The American Bar
Association (ABA) illuminated the depth of resistance to change when, in 1925,
it considered whether to recommend extension of comparative negligence to
property-damage claims arising out of maritime accidents.393 Opponents
argued that apportionment of negligence was unjust because negligence could
not be measured with perfect precision, and that the task of apportionment
would impose substantial new burdens on judges and juries.394 Supporters
replied that courts that had administered FELA cases and early state
comparative negligence laws had had no difficulty with apportionment issues
and had not had to take on extra work,395 but in its final report (1929), the ABA
recommended that comparative negligence not be expanded.396
There were other signs of resistance. Two states were uneasy about denying
slightly negligent plaintiffs all chance of recovery but felt that pure and diluted
comparative negligence went too far; they looked to the old slight-gross
distinction, enacting laws applying comparative negligence in cases where the
plaintiff’s negligence was found to be slight.397 In 1931, Wisconsin joined
Mississippi in extending comparative negligence to all torts,398 but it was able
388. See 1909 Tex. Gen. Laws 278–79; 1910 Ohio Laws 197; 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 437; 1911
Mont. Laws 47–48; 1911 Nev. Stat. 362; 1911 S.D. Sess. Laws 294; 1913 Fla. Laws 383; 1913 Neb.
Laws 311–12; 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 41; 1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws 200; 1915 Iowa Acts 181; 1915 Minn.
Laws 253; 1915 N.D. Laws 311; 1916 Va. Acts 762; 1916 S.C. Acts 970–71; 1918 Ky. Acts 153; 1913
Ark. Acts 734 (all corporations).
389. See 1911 Or. Laws 16 (building and contracting trades); 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws 491
(hazardous work in mining, manufacturing and transportation); 1919 Ark. Acts 734 (mining
companies). See also A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence:
Part II, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 604, 608–13 (1932).
390. 41 U.S.C. § 988 (1920).
391. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 2078 (1915); 1913 Ark. Acts 734 (all corporations). See generally
William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 489–91 (1953).
392. Two more states adopted little-FELA laws after 1920. 114 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 323 (1927);
1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 513.
393. T. CATESBY JONES, REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW 278, 279 (1929); Mole & Wilson, supra note 389, at 348.
394. Mole and Wilson, supra note 389, at 348–50.
395. Id. at 348, 350–51.
396. Id. at 348–49.
397. 1913 Neb. Laws 311–12; 1941 S.D. Sess. Laws 184; see also Prosser, supra note 391, at
470.
398. 1931 Wis. Sess. Laws 375.
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to do so only because conservatives dropped their opposition in order to head
off passage of a bill that would have created a state-administered no-fault
insurance system; they also persuaded Wisconsin lawmakers to retain a diluted
system.399 Comparative-negligence bills were introduced in the 1930 New
York legislature and in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Illinois in the
1940s, but none passed.400 Nearly all legal commentators who addressed
comparative negligence viewed it favorably, including William Prosser, the
leading tort reformer of the age;401 but Prosser devoted his energies mainly to
products liability law,402 and none of his colleagues saw fit to launch a
comparable crusade for comparative negligence. The conservative impulses
that had persuaded the ABA in the 1920s not to recommend expanded use of
comparative negligence continued to hold sway.403
That would not change until the 1950s and 1960s, when an increasing
number of commentators pointed out that no evidence had surfaced in
comparative-negligence states to support concerns about juries’ abuse of
apportionment power or increased court workloads and that it was inappropriate
to encourage the overlooking of slight negligence as a substitute for
comparative negligence;404 they also redoubled their criticism of contributory

399. See Joseph A. Padway, Comparative Negligence, 16 MARQ. L. REV. 3, 4 (1931); Gerald P.
Hayes, Rule of Comparative Negligence and Its Operation in Wisconsin, 23 OHIO ST. BAR ASSN. REP.
233, 234 (1950); Prosser, supra note 391, at 466 n. 6.
400. Prosser, supra note 391, at 466.
401. See, e.g., CHARLES O. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE LOSS DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE
ACTIONS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND
CONTRIBUTION IN TORT LITIGATION 59–65 (1936); PROSSER, supra note 52, § 53; A. R. H., Note,
Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania, 17 TEMPLE U. L. Q. 276 (1943); Robert A. Leflar, The
Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (1947).
402. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White,
Prosser and His Influence, 6 J. TORT L. 27, 32 (2013).
403. See John J. Haugh, Comparative Negligence: A Reform Long Overdue, 49 OR. L. REV. 38,
41 (1969).
404. See generally Philbrick, supra note 56; Prosser, supra note 391; James, Jr., supra note 3, at
732; Note, Tort–Comparative Negligence Statute, 18 VAND. L. REV., 319, 327–29 (1964); HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 52, §§ 27.2–4, 27.10; Frank E. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative
Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135, 160–63, 174 (1958); see also Haugh,
supra note 403. Prosser took a fairly detached view of comparative negligence in the first edition of
his Handbook; he became progressively more supportive in his 1953 article and in the second (1955)
and third (1964) editions of his treatise. See generally PROSSER, supra note 52, § 53; WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (2d ed. 1955); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 66 (3d ed. 1964).
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negligence as unjust.405 Perhaps more important, between 1920 and 1960 the
Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War, together with less dramatic
events such as the creation of a national highway system and national radio and
television networks,406 had instilled in Americans an unprecedented sense of
national community and shared experience and an unprecedented receptivity to
socialization of risk and accident costs.407 Even then, holdouts remained: in
1957, future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell wrote that “the
contributory negligence rule is a necessary – indeed the only – means of
exercising some limited judicial control.”408 But many conservative lawmakers
now came to view comparative negligence not as a curiosity, but as a line of
defense against more thoroughgoing socialization of tort law and as a means of
preserving at least a core element of fault in the law.409 The breakthrough came

405. In 1953, Prosser memorably denounced contributory negligence as “a rule which visits the
entire loss caused by the fault of two parties on one of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff,
least able to bear it, and quite possibly much less at fault than the defendant who goes scot free. No
one has ever succeeded in justifying that as a policy, and no one ever will.” Prosser, supra note 391,
at 469.
406. See, e.g., JOHN A. HEITMANN, THE AUTOMOBILE AND AMERICAN LIFE 77–78 (2009);
DAVID BLANKE, HELL ON WHEELS: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF AMERICA’S CAR CULTURE, 1900–
1940 27–31 (2007); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 42, 795–96 (1975) (radio and television stations and use); JAMES
BAUGHMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF MASS CULTURE: JOURNALISM, FILM, AND BROADCASTING IN
AMERICA SINCE 1941 (3d ed. 2006).
407. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL
1932–1940 84 (1963); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945 363–80 (2001); JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS:
THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 16 (1996); GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT: THE 1950S AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL BELIEF 22–24, 108–12 (2014);
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY:
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS, CAUSAL MECHANISMS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2000).
408. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury,
43 A.B.A. J. 1005, 1062 (1957); see also, e.g., Frederick S. Benson, Comparative Negligence–Boon or
Bane, 23 INS. COUNS. J. 204, 214 (1956).
409. See ABRAHAM, supra note 68, at 69–70, 92–100; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 166–67 (1980); Samuel H. Hofstadter, A Proposed
Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 328 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 59 (1960);
Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984) (stating that courts “must accommodate justice by
evolution or anticipate revolution”).
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at the end of the 1960s: between 1969 and 1984, thirty-seven states adopted
comparative negligence, some by statute410 and some by court decision.411
VII. CONCLUSION
Progressivism is sometimes viewed, inaccurately, as a movement that arose
suddenly, a movement created whole cloth by a band of reformers fighting
against entrenched forces of monopoly and corruption.412 The truth is more
complicated. Many Progressive reforms originated in the late nineteenth
century; some were advanced in their early stages by the conservative elements
the Progressives claimed they were fighting.413 The Progressives’ contribution
was to refine and expand those reforms–for example, political primary systems,
civil service laws, tax and utility reform, and industrial safety laws–and, in

410. Early modern-era pure comparative-negligence statutes include 1971 R.I. Pub. Laws 786;
1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 425; 1975 N.Y. LAW 94; 1979 La. Acts 1165; 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws 878; see
also, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226,
1229 (Cal. 1975); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Alaska 1975); Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d
400, 413 (Mich. 1977); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1240–41 (N.M. 1981); Alvis v. Ribar, 421
N.E.2d 886, 895 (Ill. 1981); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1983); Hilen, 673 S.W.2d
at 720. Early modern-era diluted comparative-negligence statutes include 1969 Haw. Sess. Laws 422–
23; 1969 Mass. Acts 685; 1969 N.H. Laws 178; 1969 Minn. Laws 1069; 1970 Vt. Acts & Resolves
193; 1971 Or. Laws 1516; 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 496; 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws 862–63; 1973 N.D.
Laws 143; 1973 Utah Laws 710–12; 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 30; 1973 Conn. Acts 1458 (Reg. Sess.);
1973 Nev. Stat 1722; 1973 N.J. Laws 300; 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws 40; 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 41; 1974
Kan. Sess. Laws 828; 1975 Mont. Laws 126–27. For comprehensive surveys of modern-era
comparative negligence laws, see Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons From
the Adoption of Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1 (2007); and VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 1.1, 2.1 (2d ed. 1986).
411. Early court decisions adopting pure comparative negligence include Hoffman, 280 So.2d at
434; Li, 532 P.2d at 1232; Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049; Kirby, 256 N.W.2d at 403; Scott, 634 P.2d at 1240–
41; Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 895; Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 16; Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 720. (Only one court
adopted diluted comparative negligence). Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883
(W.Va. 1979).
412. Some of the movement’s leaders, most notably Wisconsin’s Robert La Follette, cultivated
this image in order to further their cause and their personal mystique. See ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE,
LA FOLLETTE’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCES 176–277
(1913).
413. See, e.g., CHARLES E. MERRIAM & LOUISE OVERACKER, PRIMARY ELECTIONS 1–5, 24–25
(1928) (early history of election reform); THELEN, supra note 13 at, 6–8, 192–93 (same); ARI
HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT,
1865–1883 53–63 (1961) (early history of civil-service reform); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 16–17, 65–70 (1954) (early history of tax reform); Magoun v. Illinois. Tr. & Sav.
Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 287–88 (1898) (same); Werner Troesken, Regime Change and Corruption: A
History of Public Utility Regulation, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S
ECONOMIC HISTORY 259, 260–62 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin, eds., 2006); see also supra
Part III as to the early history of workplace reform.
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many cases, bring them to fruition.414 The same is true of Progressive-era tort
reform.
A. Progressivism and Workers Compensation
Workers compensation’s decoupling of fault from liability was a dramatic
departure from traditional tort law, but it was not entirely without precedent:
during the mid-nineteenth century, many states had enacted fencing statutes
imposing absolute liability for livestock loss on railroads that failed to fence
their rights of way, 415 and the road to workers compensation’s political life
began well before the turn of the twentieth century.416 Critics of contributory
negligence’s harsher aspects appeared almost as soon as the doctrine took hold
in American courts, led by some of the judges who were being asked to apply
it.417 As early as the 1850s, judges in the South and Midwest softened or
rejected the fellow-servant rule;418 judges across the nation attempted less
successfully to soften contributory negligence through degrees-of-negligence
classifications and creative definitions of proximate cause.419 Efforts to soften
contributory negligence continued after the Civil War, as railroad and
workplace injuries multiplied and were increasingly seen as a social, not just an
individual misfortune.420 Most states abolished the fellow-servant rule for
railroads, and in some cases for other industries as well; they also created and
elaborated employer duties of safety, and some enacted industrial-safety and
anti-waiver statutes.421 These changes were not a panacea for accident victims,
but they provided a counterbalance to the advantages that contributory
negligence had long given to employers.
Progressivism did not become a well-defined political movement until the
turn of the twentieth century422 but the upper-middle-class reformers, drawn
heavily from business and the professions, who formed a core element of the
Progressive Movement began speaking out as early as the 1860s.423 They
414. See supra Part IV; see also RANNEY, supra note 236, at 259–332 and authorities cited supra
note 13.
415. See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
416. See supra Part III.
417. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
418. See supra Part II.C.
419. See supra Part II.A.
420. See supra Part III.
421. See supra Part III.
422. See LA FOLLETTE, supra note 412, at 176–277; see also, e.g., WESSER, supra note 13,
WARNER, supra note 13, at vii.
423. See HOOGENBOOM, supra note 413, at 53–63; FREDERICK C. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PUBLIC SERVICE 35–36 (1968); RANNEY, supra note 236, at 259–60, 271–72.
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played key roles in advancing early civil service reform424 and in opening
debates over diversification of the American tax system425 and railroad and
utility regulation,426 and they played a similar role in the workers compensation
movement. Carroll Wright, whose work in the 1880s and 1890s first brought
widespread attention to the full magnitude of the industrial-accident problem
and to the availability of a no-fault alternative, was an exemplar of this class;427
but many other members of that class joined him in that task both before and
after Progressivism entered its partisan phase.428
The fact that the workers compensation movement accelerated, and the first
workers compensation laws were enacted during the years that marked the
height of the Progressive Movement was no coincidence. Workers’
compensation reflected Progressives’ devout belief in expertise and scientific
rationalism as the foundation of democracy and economic security,429 and
without the energy and publicity skills of Progressives such as Crystal Eastman,
John Commons, and a host of other writers and lobbyists,430 workers
compensation might never have come to pass. Progressive ire over judicial
overriding of juries and rejection of reform laws also played a role. American
judges took note of that ire and deemed it important enough to be worthy of
response.431 There is evidence that as the Progressive Era advanced, judges in
some states became more cautious about striking down reform laws;432 and this
trend, together with the striking lack of judicial opposition when workers
compensation laws were challenged in state and federal courts,433 strongly
suggests that progressive ire contributed to the laws’ survival.
B. Progressivism and Comparative Negligence
Why comparative negligence blossomed during the Progressive Era is a
more difficult question. Georgia’s comparative-negligence system, adopted
during the 1850s, remained in place throughout the nineteenth century,434 but at
the dawn of the Progressive Era, apart from Florida435 and a failed experiment
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

RANNEY, supra note 236, at 259–60.
PAUL, supra note 413, at 16–17, 65–70; RANNEY, supra note 236, at 296–97.
Troesken, supra note 413, at 260–62; RANNEY, supra note 131, at 124–25.
See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212–32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra notes 351–56 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7 and 62 and accompanying text.
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in Illinois,436 no other state had followed suit. The legislative history of
Wisconsin’s 1907 law437–the first modern comparative negligence law, one
which provided guidance for the 1908 FELA, for the wave of little-FELA state
laws that followed and for Mississippi’s 1910 pure comparative negligence
law438–contains no accounts of spirited debates or intellectual revelation; but
we do have several clues as to Wisconsin lawmakers’ thinking. Justice
Bleckley of Georgia had made clear that apportionment of comparative
negligence was almost entirely at the jury’s discretion,439 and Wisconsin’s
lawmakers rejected lobbyists’ complaints that comparative negligence would
allow juries to run riot,440 but they cabined jury recovery by creating a diluted
system that allowed accident victims a proportional recovery only if they were
less negligent than the defendant.441 These clues indicate that for the
comparative-negligence movement, the key to success was overcoming fear of
juries.
That conclusion is supported by several other pieces of evidence. First, by
1907 Progressives were freely expressing ire over judicial overriding of juries.
During their time in power, they also tried to cabin judicial power over juries
in two ways. First, several state legislatures abolished, entirely or in part,
judges’ traditional power to direct juries to enter a particular verdict where the
judge believed the evidence permitted only one result.442 Second, Progressives
advocated the jury-friendly “scintilla” rule, which held that a case must go the
jury where there was “any evidence . . . tending to prove each material fact put
in issue,”443 over the traditional English rule, which held that judges must take
cases away from juries unless there was evidence “upon which the jury can

436. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
437. 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 903; WIS. STATS. § 1816a (1911).
438. See supra Part VI.A.
439. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Neely, 56 Ga. 540, 544 (1876); see supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
440. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
441. 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 903; WIS. STAT. § 1816a(4) (1911).
442. 1912 Va. Acts 83; 1913 Minn. Laws 336; 1923 Wis. Sess. Laws 38. American judges
resisted this reform vigorously: several state courts either circumvented the laws or struck them down.
See Zimmerman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 151 N.W. 412, 413 (Minn. 1915); Small v. Va. Ry. & Power
Co., 99 S.E. 525, 528 (Va. 1919); Thoe v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195
N.W. 407, 409 (Wis. 1923). Barksdale v. S. Ry. Co., 148 S.E. 683, 686 (Va. 1929). See generally
Renee Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal
Rules of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 503–05 (2013).
443. Lerner, supra note 442, at 475–86.
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properly . . . find a verdict.”444 Supporters of the scintilla praised it as “the
personified sentinel of the right of trial by jury,” one essential to true justice,445
while opponents countered that that allowing cases with clear outcomes to go
to juries would be an “idle exercise” and that the scintilla rule as a tool for
delay and coercion of defendants.446 Bleckley’s comments indicated that
comparative negligence offered another way to reduce judges’ overriding
powers.447 Roujet Marshall dissented in the Kiley and Zeratsky cases because
he recognized that fact.448
The message of trust in juries sent by Progressives, together with an
increasing sense that comparative negligence provided a fairer outcome than
contributory negligence, played key roles in opening the door for the wider
adoption of comparative negligence fifty years later. Conversely, comparativenegligence opponents continued to invoke fears of rogue juries as the twentieth
century progressed, ranging from the American Bar Association’s 1929 report
that rejected extension of comparative negligence to maritime law to Lewis
Powell’s 1957 plea that the walls of contributory negligence be kept in place.449
Americans’ increasing acceptance between 1920 and 1970 of the legitimacy of
collective action and of the desirability of socializing accident costs finally
turned the tide.450
Workers’ compensation and comparative negligence were fundamental
steps in the United States’ transition from an accident cost allocation system
based on the nineteenth-century principles of instrumentalism and individual
responsibility to a modern system that recognized the inevitability of accidents
in an urbanized industrial society and accepted a large degree of accident cost
444. Id. The scintilla rule enjoyed favor in many early-nineteenth-century American courts, id.,
but as the century advanced, American elites became increasingly distrustful of juries and the English
standard enjoyed a new vogue. Id. at 475–78, 488–90; see Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. 116, 121 (1885)
(emphasis added).
445. See M.A. Foran, The Scintilla Rule and Its Relations to Trial by Jury, 4 W. RSRV. L. J. 143,
143 (1898); M.J. Fulton, Directing Verdicts, 16 VA. L. REG. 241, 241–45 (1910).
446. See James Troup, Should the Scintilla Rule Be Abolished?, 4 W. RSRV. L. J. 117, 119–21
(1898); Samuel C. Graham, Directing Verdicts, 16 VA. L. REG. 401, 402–03, 406 (1910). A number
of jurists questioned whether the dispute had any real meaning. Harvard law professor James Bradley
Thayer sided with jury defenders, but he could “hardly believe that the difference is, at bottom,
anything more than a difference over words.” Letter from J.B. Thayer to editors, reprinted in The
Scintilla Rule–A Symposium, 4 W. RES. L. J. 169, 177 (Dec. 1898). See also JOHN H. WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 4:§ 2494 (1905) (stating that
“There is no virtue in any form of words” for stating the rule).
447. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
448. Kiley v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. 138 Wis. 215, 253, 119 N.W. 309, 317, 324
(Wis. 1909) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra notes 380–82 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 392–403 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 406–07 and accompanying text.
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socialization. Workers’ compensation legitimized the principle of direct cost
socialization and applied it on a scale never seen before, albeit to a single
defined class of Americans. Comparative negligence represented a broader
and, in some ways, more radical form of cost socialization: it directly attacked
the principle that a victim responsible in any way for his own injury must bear
the entire loss, replaced it with the principle of allocation of cost in proportion
to fault and put primary responsibility for allocation in the hands of juries.
Because of its radical cast, comparative negligence had to travel a longer and
more arduous path to success than did workers compensation.451 Progressives
played a central role in the American transition from a rural, agricultural society
to an urbanized, mature industrial nation; they likewise played a central role in
tort law’s transition to a partly-socialized cost allocation system. Tort law’s
history cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the Progressive
ethic and the contributions that Progressives made, and of the late-nineteenthcentury tort reform efforts that paved the way.

451. See supra Parts IV, VI.

